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ABSTRACT 
This was the first study in 18 years to assess licensed psychologists in the United States 
for their own mental illness and mental health treatment history. It is the only known study 
linking U.S. psychologists’ own mental health to stigmatizing attitudes toward people with 
mental illness. The primary hypothesis, based on Allport’s contact hypothesis and Pettigrew’s 
intergroup contact theory, that increased levels of contact with people with mental illness would 
predict lower levels of stigma, was not supported. Instead a complex relationship between 
psychologists’ own mental illness, current psychological distress, and mental health stigma 
emerged. 
Despite the past finding that psychologists with their own experiences of mental illness 
and adversity experience stigma from other psychologists, in the present study the majority of 
the 143 participants reported personal experience with mental illness. In fact, 73% reported 
experiencing a mental illness and 76% reported having sought treatment for a mental illness in 
their lifetimes – findings similar to past studies. In contrast, over 75% scored in the nonclinical 
range on current psychological distress. Despite past life experiences, when psychologists had 
higher levels of psychological distress their self-stigmas of seeking help and mental illness 
increased and they identified less with other psychologists. Furthermore, the less psychologists 
identified with people with mental illness the more they personally endorsed stigma against 
people with mental illness. I suggest that, instead of stigmatizing psychologists with past and 
current mental illness, we as psychologists instead strive for openness and support in order to 
encourage growth and resiliency among colleagues.   
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION/OVERVIEW 
Mental illness stigma is powerful; its effects pervasive and grievous. People with mental 
illness often face discrimination in employment, housing, health care, and social interaction 
(Bathje & Pryor, 2011; Corrigan, Roe, & Tsang, 2011). While it is estimated that about one in 
four adult Americans suffer with a diagnosable mental illness during the course of a year 
(Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005), less than one third of those will seek treatment from a 
mental health professional (Bathje & Pryor, 2011). This is considering ample evidence that 
mental health treatments work (Wampold & Imel, 2015). While the reasons behind this paradox 
are varied, mental health stigma is one of the most critical factors (Bathje & Pryor, 2011; 
Henderson, Evans-Lacko, & Thornicroft, 2013).  
Mental health related stigma research has grown over the past 20 years, growing out of a 
larger body of stigma research. It built off Goffman’s (1963) seminal work on stigma describing 
it as the view non-stigmatized individuals, or “normals” as he calls them, have of those with a 
stigmatized identity as not quite human, and so these normals do not feel the need to treat them 
with the same respect and dignity as other humans. After Goffman, stigma research developed 
around a diverse set of issues, only one of which was mental illness. There was little agreement 
on a definition of stigma. Link and Phelan (2001) came in and provided a conceptualization of 
stigma that could be used across disciplinary fields. Researchers focusing on mental health 
related stigma defined mental illness stigma (i.e. Corrigan, 2004), developed distinctions 
between mental illness stigma and help-seeking stigma (i.e. Komiya, Good, & Sherrod, 2000; 
Tucker, Hammer, Vogel, Bitman, Wade, & Maier, 2013), and distinctions between public stigma 
and self-stigma (i.e. Ben-Porath, 2002; Corrigan, Kerr, & Knudsen, 2005; Vogel & Wade, 2009). 
Finally, personal stigma functions as the public stigma that a person believes him or herself, 
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rather than that a person reports what others believe (Schnyder, Panczak, Groth, & Schultze-
Lutter, 2017; Eisenberg, Downs, Golberstein, & Zivin, 2009). 
While the presence of mental health stigma has been well explored in the general 
population, equally rigorous studies exploring this stigma in mental health professionals have 
been far scarcer. What studies there have been indicate that mental health professionals have the 
same levels of mental illness stigma as the general population, if not more (Schulze, 2007). What 
is concerning about this is that, although the general population has no systematic opportunity to 
act on their stigma, mental health professionals have a direct impact on people with mental 
illness as a function of their profession. People who use mental health services have reported a 
variety of negative experiences with mental health professionals (Schulze, 2007; Knaak, Mantler, 
& Szeto, 2017).  
In addition, mental health professionals who have their own mental illness have reported 
experiences of stigmatization from colleagues (Knaak et al., 2017; Zeruvabel & Wright, 2012; 
Cain, 2000). This is considering that studies have estimated 60-70 percent of psychologists have 
experienced some mental illness – in most cases mild to moderate depression – in their lifetime 
(Pope & Tabachnick, 1994; Gilroy, Murra, & Carroll, 2002; Tay, Alcock, & Scior, 2018). That 
said, far fewer psychologists (about 10 percent or less) reported having what might be 
categorized as severe mental illness, including severe depression, psychosis, bipolar disorder, 
more than passive suicidal ideation, or any mental illness that resulted in hospitalization (Pope & 
Tabachnick, 1994; Gilroy, Murra, & Carroll, 2002; Tay, Alcock, & Scior, 2018). As far as this 
author knows, this paradoxical relationship between psychologists’ own mental illness and their 
stigmatizing attitudes toward others with mental illness has not been explained in the literature.  
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In any case, the level of mental health professionals’ mental illness stigma is striking 
when considered through the lens of the contact hypothesis and intergroup contact theory, as 
mental health professionals have regular interaction with people with mental illness, which – 
under the right conditions – could reduce prejudice or stigma (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998, 
2011). Conditions of the contact hypothesis include that the two groups have equal status in the 
contact situation, must be working for common goals, be cooperating with one another rather 
than competing, and have support from authority, law, or custom. Intergroup contact theory 
posits the process by which the contact hypothesis works. This includes four processes of 
change: learning about the outgroup, changing behavior, generating emotional ties like one sees 
in friendship, and proving insight about the ingroup as well as the outgroup.  
In order to better understand the complicated relationship between mental health 
professionals (in this case psychologists) and their clients/patients, a study of their stigma levels, 
their own mental illness, and their amount of contact with clients and others with mental illness 
is needed.  
The Present Study 
 In the present dissertation, I collected information on psychologists’ own history of 
mental illness and experiences with mental health treatment and their level of mental health 
related stigma toward the general population and psychologists with mental illness. I applied that 
information to test Allport’s contact hypothesis and Pettigrew’s intergroup contact theory in this 
population. The sample included 143 licensed psychologists contacted through various American 
Psychological Association (APA) Division listservs and state psychological association listservs. 
Then I used bivariate correlations and a series of hierarchical regressions to test how different 
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levels of contact influence four kinds of stigma: personal stigma of mental illness, personal 
stigma of seeking help, self-stigma of mental illness, and self-stigma of seeking help.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 As recounted by Corrigan, Roe, and Tsang (2011), many aspects of mental health stigma 
have been around for millennia. Greeks of the classical era reflected stigma of mental illness 
through beliefs that mental illness came about through displeasure from the gods; ancient plays 
showed deities damning people with psychosis, bipolar, or depression. Relics from ancient Egypt 
show attempts to cure individuals of demon possession, of mental illness. Ancient Hebrews 
punished disturbed behavior by death; Mayans and Aztecs threw out demons by human sacrifice. 
In the religious fervor of the Middle Ages in Europe, symptoms of mental illness were seen as a 
result of the individual’s wickedness, demon possession requiring exorcism, or even burning at 
the stake in order to erase wickedness from the community. Even as late as the 18th and 19th 
centuries the practice was to put people with mental illness into asylums: chaining people to 
walls, denying them basic needs such as food or clothing, and “treatments” that terrified patients. 
It was not until there were movements in several countries around the 1800’s that “moral” 
treatments were advocated for, including treating the individual with respect and kindness and 
establishing asylums that were less like prisons and more like retreat centers. The advent of 
psychiatric medication in the 1950’s allowed many who lived with chronic mental illness to have 
control over symptoms, allowing some to return to their communities instead of living in 
asylums.  
 This is not to say that mental health related stigma does not exist today, by any stretch of 
the imagination. Mass media, an immensely influential source of stigma, depicts people with 
mental illness as dangerous, unpredictable, or inept (Corrigan, Roe, & Tsang, 2011). One only 
has to look at the headlines regarding mental illness or recent films that depict mental illness. 
Mass shooting? More often not they are attributed to serious mental illness or “dangerous 
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people” rather than “dangerous weapons,” according to one study that looked at news stories 
from 1997-2012 (McGinty, Webster, Jarlenski, Barry, 2014; p.406). In a similar study of 400 
news stories about mental illness from 1995-2014, the most common topic in relation to mental 
illness was violence (57%), with mentions of mass shootings being more common in the second 
decade than the first (McGinty, Kennedy-Hendricks, Chosky, & Barry, 2016). Notable films 
depicting people with mental illness as violent include Psycho (Hitchcock, 1960) about a violent, 
mentally unstable hotel owner; Silence of the Lambs (Demme, 1991) with the unforgettable 
Hannibal Lector, a former psychiatrist in a hospital for the criminally insane after being caught 
cannibalizing his victims; Shutter Island (Scorsese, 2010) with its depiction of dozens in a 
hospital for the criminally insane; and Split (Shyamalan, 2016) where a man with dissociative 
identity disorder kidnaps three girls (Morris, 2016; Kondo, 2008). Corrigan and colleagues noted 
that the stigma of mental illness has been worsening over the past 50 years (2011)1.  
The effects of media portrayals as well as other factors that influence mental health 
related stigma are far reaching and impact the daily lives of people with mental illness. The 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) group surveyed adults in 37 U.S. states 
and territories about their attitudes toward mental illness. Based on their data a majority of adults 
agreed that treatment can help persons with mental illness lead normal lives, both individuals 
with psychological distress (78%) and without psychological distress (89%). Unfortunately, 
while 57 percent of the whole sample believed people are caring and sympathetic to people with 
mental illness, only 25 percent of adults who personally experienced psychological distress 
believed so (CDC, 2010). Furthermore, according to Mental Health America, 58 percent of 
 
1 For a more comprehensive list of negative portrayals of mental illness in the media, I suggest 
reading Corrigan and colleagues’ book, Challenging the Stigma of Mental Illness. 
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Americans do not want to have a person with mental illness in their workplace and 68 percent do 
not want one to marry into their family (2011). As previously mentioned, people with mental 
illnesses often face discrimination in health care, social interaction, housing, and employment 
(Bathje & Pryor, 2011). In addition, both the family and friends of a person with mental illness 
can experience stigma as well (Corrigan, Kerr, & Knudsen, 2005).  
One would hope that mental health professionals would not hold such stigmatizing 
attitudes, however, what limited research has been done on the topic suggests that they have the 
same levels of stigma as the general population (Schulze, 2007). This is concerning as mental 
health professionals have far more direct contact with people with mental illness than the general 
population and have direct influence over their lives. People who use mental health services have 
reported a variety of negative experiences with mental health professionals including receiving 
threats of coercive treatment, being told they will not recover from their mental illness, receiving 
insufficient information about diagnosis and treatment options, being treated in a demeaning or 
paternalistic way, and being spoken to or about with derogatory or demeaning language (Knaak, 
Mantler, & Szeto, 2017). 
What is more, mental health professionals stigmatize not only clients or patients, but 
colleagues with mental illness as well (Knaak, Mantler, & Szeto, 2017). Zeruvabel and Wright 
(2012) suggest that a false dichotomy is drawn in the world of psychological professionals that 
separates the wounded (client or patient) from the healer (psychologist). The authors posit that 
wounded healers, or individuals who identify as healing others through their history of mental 
illness, are a silenced and stigmatized minority among psychologists. However, these individuals 
could offer valuable insight into the relationships between mental health professionals and their 
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clients and facilitate a decrease in the stigma professionals hold against people with mental 
illness. 
Now that we have some background on mental health related stigma, it is important to 
establish a theoretical understanding of the construct of stigma and how it works. But first, a note 
about terminology.  
Stigma vs. Prejudice 
The terms “stigma” and “prejudice” will both come up in this dissertation, and therefore a 
review of their evolving definitions is warranted. Definitions of the two were penned by the 
seminal authors Allport and Goffman. Allport’s definition of prejudice was centered around 
ethnic prejudice and was defined as, “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible 
generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or 
toward an individual because he is a member of that group” (1954, p.9). Goffman’s definition of 
stigma, on the other hand, is when a person is denied full social acceptance and the stigmatized 
individual is “reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one” 
(Goffman, 1963, p. 3). From that point, two distinct literatures formed with little cross 
communication until the 1990’s.  
Because it is not unheard of for two literatures to develop around basically identical 
concepts, Phelan, Link, and Dovidio (2008) reviewed 18 models of prejudice and stigma to 
determine whether the two concepts were, in fact, distinct. They concluded from their study that 
stigma and prejudice are essentially “the same animal” with most differences being a function of 
focus and emphasis (Phelan, Link, & Dovidio, 2008; p. 367). The most salient distinction 
between the two was that prejudice generally focuses on race, ethnicity, and religion while 
stigma is more general and focuses on disease and disabilities as well as deviant behavior and 
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identities. Following Dovidio, Major, and Crocker (2000), the authors suggested using “stigma” 
to refer to a broader process including a variety of identities and characteristics and “prejudice” 
to refer to the attitudinal pieces of this process. That said, Phelan, Link, and Dovidio saw enough 
overlap between stigma and prejudice that they encouraged researchers to reach across the 
conceptual line when looking for theory, methods, and research findings to support future 
projects. This paper follows this suggestion and so the terms stigma and prejudice will serve as 
proxies for one another.  
Roots of the Study of Stigma 
As alluded to above, a seminal work in the study of stigma was Erving Goffman’s 
Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (1963). As a note, in the work he refers to 
the stigmatized individual as a person with a stigma and a non-stigmatized individual as a 
“normal.” Goffman (1963) offers several important implications of having a stigmatized quality 
or identity, or a stigma. He asserts that normals “believe the person with a stigma is not quite 
human” (p. 5). This is stigma in its essence; that because normals do not think of stigmatized 
individuals as entirely human they are not required to treat them with the respect and dignity 
owed human beings. Goffman posits that, “On this assumption [normals] exercise varieties of 
discrimination, through which [they] effectively, if often unthinkingly, reduce [the stigmatized 
individual’s] life chances” (p.5). Due to the negative implications of being stigmatized, a 
stigmatized individual will often attempt to conceal the stigmatized trait.  
Goffman (1963) divides stigmatized individuals into two groups, those who are 
discredited or those for whom their stigmatized trait is readily apparent, and those who are 
discreditable or those for whom their stigmatized trait is not readily apparent. Some examples of 
people who are discredited include people in wheelchairs, people with dark skin, or people in 
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specific religious garb such as a turban or a hijab. Some examples of people who are 
discreditable include people with mental illness, queer individuals, or people with ambiguous 
skin color. Those who are discredited are immediately subject to prejudice and discrimination 
while those who are discreditable can hide the stigmatized trait to avoid prejudice and 
discrimination but must always be fearful of being discovered.  
Furthermore, Goffman (1963) states that “the stigmatized individual tends to hold the 
same beliefs about identity” that normals do (p.7), meaning that even if he or she does succeed in 
hiding their stigmatized trait they may internalize the negative beliefs. This can lead to self-
loathing because one does not see oneself as completely human.  
Goffman’s conceptualization of stigma in general is readily applied to the stigma 
associated with having a mental illness. People with mental illness have a discreditable stigma in 
that most people with mental illness can hide that they have a mental illness. However, when the 
mental illness is discovered, they regularly face discrimination in employment, housing, 
healthcare, and social interaction (Bathje & Pryor, 2011). Furthermore, as described in more 
detail later, there is a process of internalizing stigma beliefs that further impacts the individual.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, stigma is defined as “a mark of shame associated 
with a specific condition or characteristic” (Lannin, Vogel, Brenner, & Tucker, 2015; p. 65; 
Goffman, 1963). More recent research has delineated several important variations of mental 
illness stigma that play a role in the process of seeking mental health treatment.  
Link and Phelan’s Conceptualization of Stigma 
Almost 40 years after Goffman’s seminal work, Link and Phelan (2001) sought to 
conceptualize stigma. After Goffman’s essay there was an abundance of research on stigma in 
diverse areas, from mental illness to leprosy to exotic dancing. Researchers were not all 
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psychologists, either, as stigma research has been multidisciplinary through the years. 
Sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and social geographers have all been involved. 
As one might imagine, definitions of stigma varied, sometimes due to the type of stigma (e.g., 
mental illness vs. leprosy), sometimes as a result of differences in disciplinary field. But even 
within disciplines, there has been variation in stigma definitions. Link and Phelan (2001), both 
sociologists, sought to conceptualize stigma in a way that would synthesize the literature but still 
allow for some variation based on context and discipline.  
Link and Phelan’s conceptualization contained four components: labeling, stereotyping, 
separation, and status loss and discrimination (2001). The first component, labeling, is the 
process by which society takes aspects of human difference (sometimes alleged human 
difference), draws attention to certain aspects, and assigns salience to them. The idea behind this 
is that there are all sorts of human difference that are ignored, such as the color of one’s car or 
the size of one’s feet. The authors give an example of how in the late 19th century small 
foreheads and large faces were labeled as ape-like and thought to indicate that the people with 
these features had criminal natures. The word “label” as opposed to “attribute” or “condition” is 
important because, unlike the other terms, it does not imply that the designation has validity. 
This distinction is key. The term “label” highlights the fact that the human difference has been 
named and designated as inferior by certain groups in a way that is not inherent to the human 
difference itself.   
The second component, stereotyping, involves the process by which labeled differences 
are linked to stereotypes. This aspect of stigma was emphasized by Goffman (1963) and is 
central to many definitions of stigma, especially in psychology. Link and Phelan give an example 
from a study completed by Link and colleagues (1987). The study consisted of vignettes which 
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were randomly assigned to participants. In half of the vignettes the characters were labeled as 
“former mental patients” and in the other half “former back-pain patients.” The study measured 
rejecting responses toward the vignette character and to what extent participants believed that 
mental patients were dangerous in general. The authors found that when the character was 
labeled as a former back-pain patient endorsement of the dangerousness of mental patients did 
not predict rejecting responses. In contrast, when the character was labeled as a former mental 
patient endorsement of the dangerousness of mental patients predicted rejecting responses. 
Participants only attached the negative stereotype to the character when he or she had been 
labeled (Link, Cullen, Frank, & Wozniak, 1987).   
  The third component of stigma in Link and Phelan’s conceptualization is separation, or 
when the label suggests a separation of “us” and “them” (2001). Linking labels to undesirable 
characteristics, then, is the reason behind believing that labeled people are fundamentally 
different from those who are not labeled. When labeled people are considered distinct, or 
“different than,” stereotyping is easily employed, because it doesn’t impact the person 
stereotyping to affix all types of bad characteristics to “them.” This is where Goffman asserts 
that normals (non-stigmatized people) “believe the person with a stigma is not quite human” 
(1963; p. 5). This component of stigma is revealed in the way people commonly talk about 
stigmatized people. For example, a person with schizophrenia is frequently called a 
“schizophrenic,” but less stigmatized conditions are not spoken about this way; people have the 
flu or cancer, they are not considered synonymous with their condition, for example, by being 
labeled an “influenzic” or a “cancerite” (Link & Phelan, 2001).  
The fourth and final component of stigma includes both status loss and discrimination. 
Status loss has to do with one’s relative place in the status hierarchies that occur in everyday 
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situations, such as meetings, classes, or conversations. Some characteristics, like race and 
gender, impact status hierarchies even if the characteristic has nothing to do with the person’s 
proficiency in the task at hand. For example, men and European Americans are more likely than 
women and African Americans to have higher status – they talk more often, their ideas are more 
likely to be accepted, and they are more likely to be chosen as leaders. This component often 
occurs outside awareness such that it can be difficult to specify exactly what caused the unequal 
outcome, but nonetheless unequal outcomes result (Link & Phelan, 2001).  
The other part of the fourth component, discrimination, occurs on multiple levels, 
individual and structural. On an individual level, discrimination occurs when an individual 
person acts against a person with a stigmatized trait, whether overtly or covertly. For example, 
overt discrimination occurs when a person rejects a job application from or refuses to rent an 
apartment to a person with a stigmatized trait whether that person makes their reasoning clear or 
not. On a structural level, discrimination can be more insidious and have a far-reaching impact. 
One example the authors gave was how schizophrenia is a particularly stigmatized mental 
illness. Treatment facilities for schizophrenia are either isolated from other people or in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods that do not have enough influence to keep away the treatment 
facility. Furthermore, the most successful mental health professionals treat people with less 
stigmatized and perhaps less serious mental illnesses in more affluent areas that people with 
schizophrenia cannot always access. Thus, whether or not an individual may overtly discriminate 
against a person with schizophrenia, the institution is set up in a discriminatory manner (Link & 
Phelan, 2001).  
Link and Phelan (2001) emphasize that “it takes power to stigmatize” (p.375). It is easy 
to focus so much on the stigmatized trait that one is unaware of the power differential between 
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the stigmatized and the non-stigmatized. The authors offer an example of a patient in a program 
for people with severe mental illness. Even if the patient were to label a particular provider a 
“pill pusher” and engage in all of the stigmatizing components discussed above, the provider 
would not be stigmatized because the patient does not possess the power to enact any serious 
consequences on the provider. A person must control some sort of access to resources such as 
education, employment, housing, or health care to make it so that the distinctions they draw have 
a wider impact. Without power, some of the components of stigma might exist, but the whole 
beast would not be present (Link & Phelan, 2001).  
Public vs. Self-Stigma of Mental Illness 
Public stigma of mental illness. Whereas Link and Phelan (2001) conceptualized stigma 
as a whole, Corrigan (2004) conceptualized stigma as it relates to mental illness in particular. He 
notes the importance of four social-cognitive processes in relation to stigma: cues, stereotypes, 
prejudice, and discrimination. To begin, the general public may believe that a person has a 
mental illness based on cues, such as psychiatric symptoms, physical appearance, deficits in 
socials skills, and the label of mental illness as given by a mental health professional or as 
inferred when a person walks out of a mental health professional’s office. Once the general 
public is cued in that a person has a mental illness, stereotypes are then brought to mind. 
Stereotypes allow people to quickly draw conclusions about social groups. In the case of mental 
illness, some common stereotypes include that people with mental illness are dangerous, 
incompetent, or to blame for their condition. People who are prejudiced against people with 
mental illness endorse the negative stereotypes and have negative emotional responses as a 
result. Finally, the prejudice (a cognitive and affective response) leads to discrimination (a 
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behavioral response). Discrimination includes negative actions against people with mental illness 
or, conversely, positive actions only for people without mental illness.  
Public stigma of mental illness includes the negative stereotypes, prejudice, and 
discrimination of those known to have a mental illness (Corrigan, 2004; Corrigan, Kerr, & 
Knudsen, 2005). Examples of public stigma include not wanting to have a person with mental 
illness marry into one’s family, being more negative and critical of a job applicant who identifies 
as having a mental illness, or not wanting a person with mental illness to serve in a position of 
authority (Corrigan, 2004; Link, 1987). They are, in essence, society’s negative attitudes toward 
people with mental illness.  
Self-stigma of mental illness. Prejudice and discrimination against those with a mental 
illness are heavy burdens to carry for many people with mental illness. However, the effects of 
stigma do not stop there, as stigma can be internalized. Self-stigma of mental illness occurs when 
an individual with mental illness internalizes public stigma, leading to lower self-esteem, self-
efficacy, and hope for one’s future (Corrigan, 2004; Vogel, Wade, & Haake, 2006). As suggested 
by Goffman “the stigmatized individual tends to hold the same beliefs about identity” as the 
general public, namely that stigmatized individuals are less than human (Goffman, 1963, p.7). 
Link (1987) provides an excellent example – patients who had been hospitalized and who 
endorsed stigmatizing beliefs about patients like themselves experienced worse outcomes, such 
as loss of income and unemployment, than those who did not. This can be because self-stigma 
may impact a person’s pursuit of life goals such as obtaining employment and developing 
relationships via the “why try” effect (i.e., why should I try to have a relationship? Someone like 
me can’t handle one; Corrigan, Roe, & Tsang, 2011). Self-stigma can also impact whether a 
person will be compliant with treatment, continue going to therapy, or even seek mental health 
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services to begin with (Tucker et al., 2013). This can seriously slow the process of recovery from 
mental illness and make worse an already troubling problem.  
Thus, having a mental illness can carry both public and self-stigma. However, there is 
also stigma associated with seeking psychological help (e.g., psychotherapy). Help-seeking 
stigma has been found to be distinct from mental health stigma, explaining unique variance in 
attitudes toward and intentions to seek psychotherapy (Tucker et al., 2013). 
Help-Seeking Stigma 
Despite strong evidence that psychological treatments work (e.g. Wampold & Imel, 
2015), treatment utilization rates are low, with estimated annual rates between 1% and 15% 
worldwide (Demyttenaere et al., 2004). This leads to unnecessary suffering in addition to 
aggravating the interpersonal costs of mental illness and economic burdens related to disability 
due to mental illness (Schnyder, Panczak, Groth, & Schultze-Lutter, 2017). Help-seeking stigma 
is a barrier in the help-seeking process (Vogel et al., 2017), the size of that effect on help-seeking 
is estimated to be small to moderate (Clement et al., 2015).  
Four types of stigma influence help-seeking: perceived public stigma, personal stigma, 
self-stigma, and attitudes toward seeking psychological services (Schnyder et al., 2017). 
Perceived public stigma and personal stigma are both types of public stigma, and so are similar 
to the public stigma of mental illness as described above. Public stigma of help-seeking here is 
defined as “an external form of stigma that denotes the perception held by society that 
individuals are undesirable or socially unacceptable if they were to seek help” (Vogel et al., 
2017; p. 3). Perceived public stigma, then, is an individual’s perception of society’s stigma of 
help seeking whereas personal stigma is the stigma that an individual holds him or herself toward 
others who seek help (Schnyder et al., 2017; Eisenberg, Downs, Golberstein, & Zivin, 2009).  
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Eisenberg and colleagues (2009) conducted a study to parse out the difference between 
perceived public stigma and personal stigma. They hypothesized that perceived public stigma 
and personal stigma would be independently associated with less help-seeking behavior. They 
surveyed 5,555 college students across 13 universities in various locations around the United 
States. They found that not only are perceived public stigma and personal stigma different, with 
only a moderate correlation, but that only personal stigma (not perceived public stigma) was 
associated with measures of help-seeking. Also, perceived public stigma was significantly higher 
than personal public stigma.  
In contrast to public and personal stigma, the self-stigma of seeking help is defined as 
“the perception held by the individual that he or she is undesirable or socially unacceptable if 
they were to seek help” (Vogel et al., 2017; p. 3). Vogel, Bitman, Hammer, and Wade (2013) 
conducted a longitudinal study assessing for the relationship between public stigma and self-
stigma of seeking help. They surveyed 448 college students at a large university in the 
Midwestern United States once (Time 1), then again at second point three months later (Time 2). 
They found that public stigma at Time 1 predicted self-stigma at Time 2, but that the converse 
was not true. This, they asserted, was evidence that public stigma was internalized as self-stigma.  
Tucker and colleagues (2013) assessed for whether there is a clear distinction between 
the self-stigma of mental illness and the self-stigma of seeking psychological services. They 
surveyed 217 undergraduates at a large university in the Midwest with clinical distress in 
addition to 324 web-based community members who self-reported having one or more mental 
illnesses. The authors found that not only were the two self-stigmas distinct, they found that each 
self-stigma was strongly and independently related to their corresponding public stigma. In other 
words, the self-stigma of mental illness was strongly related to the public stigma of mental 
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illness, but not the public stigma of help-seeking and the self-stigma of help-seeking was 
strongly related to the public stigma of help-seeking, but not the public stigma of mental illness. 
Each stigma operated in its own pathway.  
Attitudes toward seeking psychological services includes several aspects such as the 
perceived need for services, the tolerance of stigma related to getting services, and confidence 
that one will find relief with the services (Schnyder et al., 2017). Attitudes toward seeking 
services was found to be one of the most proximal predictors of intentions to seek counseling 
(Vogel & Wester, 2003). Vogel and Wester’s (2003) article sought to understand the role that 
avoidance factors, most importantly the fear of self-disclosure, played in attitudes and intentions 
to seek counseling. Previous research had focused only on approach factors, such as need for 
social support, distress levels, and previous experience with counseling. Across two studies with, 
respectively, 209 and 268 college students the authors found that avoidance factors accounted for 
at least as much variance as approach factors and that avoidance factors predicted negative 
attitudes toward counseling which predicted negative intentions to seek counseling. In a follow 
up study with 354 college students, Vogel, Wester, Wei, and Boysen (2005) found that 11 
psychological factors (such as social stigma, treatment fears, self-disclosure) and attitudes 
toward seeking counseling predicted more than 60% of the variance in intent to seek help for 
interpersonal problems and 18% of the variance for intent to seek help for drug problems. In 
addition, attitudes mediated most of the relationship between the psychological factors and intent 
to seek counseling.  
Self-Stigma Model 
Vogel, Wade, and Hackler (2007) brought together research on public stigma, self-
stigma, attitudes toward seeking psychological services, and intentions to seek services into one 
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model. Using data from 676 college students, the authors employed structural equation modeling 
(SEM) and showed that the relationship between perceived public stigma and intentions to seek 
counseling was fully mediated by self-stigma and attitudes toward seeking counseling (i.e., 
public stigma → self-stigma → attitudes → intentions). In an effort to find if this model 
generalized to international populations, Vogel and colleagues (2017), tested the public 
stigma→self-stigma→attitudes relationship with a sample of 3,276 college students from 10 
international sites (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong, Portugal, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, 
United Arab Emirates, and United States). Again, using SEM the authors found that the 
relationship between public stigma and attitudes was mediated by self-stigma at each site. 
It should be noted that one limitation of the self-stigma research is that it has primarily 
been conducted with college students. It is important to expand the above findings to see if they 
apply to other populations, such as the population of interest in this paper, psychologists. As we 
shall see, psychologists experience their own mental health problems and experience the stigma 
of mental illness and help-seeking just as college students do. Furthermore, there are factors that 
complicate psychologists’ decisions to seek help that do not apply to college students. 
Psychologists’ own Mental Illness 
In 1994, Pope and Tabachnick published a study assessing psychologists’ mental health 
and experiences with mental health treatment. Questionnaires were mailed to 800 randomly 
selected psychologists (400 men and 400 women) from the APA’s Divisions 12 (Clinical 
Psychology), 17 (Counseling Psychology), 29 (Psychotherapy), and 42 (Psychologists in 
Independent Practice). Their sample included 476 respondents. In their study, 61% of 
participants reported at least one episode of clinical depression in their life, 15% had taken 
psychotropic medication as a part of their treatment, and 3.8% had had a psychiatric 
hospitalization. While specific diagnoses were not collected, it was clear that mental health 
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concerns among psychologists were not uncommon. In 2002, Gilroy, Murra, and Carroll 
performed a similar study, this time looking at counseling psychologists’ personal experiences 
with depression and treatment. Questionnaires were mailed to 1000 randomly selected members 
of Division 17 (Counseling Psychology) of the American Psychological Association (APA) who 
were either full- or part-time licensed clinicians. There were 425 respondents. Out of the 425, 
62% self-identified as depressed with the preponderance of those experiencing dysthymia 
(chronic mild depression) and adjustment disorder with depressed mood. Forty-two percent 
reported experiencing some form of suicidal ideation or behavior. Thirty-one percent reported 
that they had been prescribed psychotropic medication. Finally, 2% reported having been 
hospitalized for depression. Some level of depression, therefore, is common among 
psychologists.  
Interestingly, the most commonly reported negative impact on the psychologists’ 
collegial relationships was a sense of withdrawal and isolation from colleagues while being 
depressed. The experiences of psychologists with depression reflects a typical occurrence for 
those with depression; people with depression in general often deal with negative attitudes, 
rejection, and devaluation from others including psychotherapists (Gilroy, Murra, & Carroll, 
2002).  
In a recent study of clinical psychologists in the United Kingdom, Tay, Alcock, and Scior 
(2018) found similar figures to Gilroy and colleagues (2002). An invitation to complete the 
survey was emailed to the 3,600 qualified clinical psychologists who were on the mailing list of 
the British Psychological Society’s Division of Clinical Psychology (DCP). Six hundred seventy-
eight responded with usable data. Two-thirds of respondents had experienced some sort of 
mental health problems. Of those, 69.9% experienced mild to moderate depression, 42.1% 
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anxiety, 12.9% severe depression, 11.1% eating disorders, 4.2% addiction, 3.3% psychosis and 
1.2% bipolar disorder (with some reporting comorbidities).  
The negative collegial experiences of psychologists with depression have been 
documented elsewhere. In a qualitative study of psychotherapists with mental illness, Cain 
(2000) found that stigma was the primary reason participants in her study were hesitant to 
disclose their psychiatric histories to colleagues and supervisors. In fact, to varying degrees all 
participants reported that the stigma of mental illness was present in the mental health system.  
Psychologists’ Own Help-Seeking 
 Even though they did not ask about psychologists’ experiences with help-seeking per say, 
Pope and Tabachnick (1994) asked their sample of 476 psychologists who were part of the APA 
about their experiences with psychotherapy. Most of the respondents (n = 400, 84%) reported 
having been a therapy client at some point in their lives, with 100 respondents (21%) reporting 
they were in therapy at the time they took the survey. Of the 300 therapists who had previously 
been in therapy but were not currently in it, 188 had considered resuming therapy. Only 15 
percent had taken psychotropic medication as a part of their therapy and 4 percent had been 
hospitalized.  
 Gilroy and colleagues (2002) asked their sample of 425 Counseling Psychologists about 
their experiences with psychological treatment as well, while also collecting some information 
on help-seeking. Of their sample, 264 (62%) self-identified as depressed. Of the 264, 178 (67%) 
sought treatment for their depression symptoms. Thirty-one percent, or 58, of those who had 
sought treatment for depression reported having been prescribed psychiatric medication. Only 
2% (3) reported being hospitalized for depression. Some of the reported reasons for not seeking 
treatment included that symptoms went away, alternative coping strategies were sought, there 
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was not an acceptable therapist nearby, that there was no therapist nearby the participant did not 
already know, concerns about confidentiality, concerns about censure, not wanting to invest the 
energy, financial concerns, significant other not willing, belief that therapy wouldn’t work, and 
an unwillingness to admit the seriousness of the problem. It is important to note that some of the 
reasons for not seeking therapy, such as financial concerns and not wanting to invest the energy, 
could be said of any person with mental health concerns. However, there were some reasons that 
were specific to mental health professionals, such as that there were no therapists available that 
the participant didn’t already know. Some of the noted stipulations for seeking a therapist were 
also specific to mental health professionals, such as finding a therapist with whom one had no 
professional conflicts of interest and feeling safe in terms of confidentiality. Confidentiality 
would be particularly a problem for mental health professionals as they may have extensive 
professional contacts within the therapist community from which they are seeking treatment. For 
example, it may be a problem for a psychologist wanting therapy to go to a practice or center 
where they know anyone on staff, as simply being seen in the waiting room could feel like 
confidentiality is being breached. It can also be tricky if the therapist of the psychologist seeking 
help is in a consulting group with someone that the psychologists knows, as one’s confidentiality 
could feel at risk in that case as well.  
 In their recent study, Tay and colleagues (2018) found that of the 425 participants 
(psychologists in the United Kingdom) who had experienced a mental health problem in their 
sample, 357 (84%) had sought help. The majority, 53.2%, had sought help from a general 
practitioner and slightly less than a majority, 45.6%, had seen a private psychotherapist and 
another 11.3% reported seeing a psychotherapist through the National Health Service (NHS), the 
United Kingdom’s free, state-sponsored health care system. Others had seen a private clinical 
23 
 
psychologist (13.2%), or a psychiatrist, privately (3.8%) or through the NHS (10.1%). Only 46 
participants (16%) of those who reported a mental illness had sought help from no one. Of those 
46, over two thirds reported that they feared being judged negatively and that there would be a 
negative impact on their career if they disclosed. Shame and worry about negative impact on 
their self-image were also reported as reasons for not disclosing. The authors reported that those 
who had disclosed to no one had significantly higher self-stigma than those who had sought 
professional help.  
Intergroup Contact Theory 
Mental health professionals and people with mental illness represent two groups to which 
intergroup contact theory can be applied. In this case, people with mental illness represent the 
more stigmatized and less powerful group, whereas mental health professionals the more 
powerful group. As mentioned above, mental health professionals exhibit stigma against people 
with mental illness just as people in the general population do. They keep social distance 
between themselves and people with mental illness, especially people with more severe mental 
illness such as schizophrenia and borderline personality disorder (Schulze, 2007). Another recent 
study compared the implicit and explicit attitudes toward people with mental illness of 
professionals (psychiatrists and psychotherapists, n = 29) and non-professionals (first-year 
medical students, n = 28) at the University of Warsaw in Poland. In this case, with regard to the 
explicit attitudes, the professionals reported significantly more willingness to approach people 
with mental illness than non-professionals, with no difference in the withdrawal or distancing 
emotions between the two groups. In contrast, on the Go/No Go Association Task (GNAT), an 
implicit measure of attitudes toward people with mental illness, the two groups did not differ in 
their implicit attitudes, with both showing a significant tendency to associate “mentally ill” with 
“unpleasant” rather than “pleasant” (Kopera et al., 2015). This suggests that even if professionals 
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explicitly express fewer negative attitudes toward those with mental illness than non-
professionals, their implicit stigma is similar. Furthermore, mental health professionals with their 
own mental illness have reported that the mental health system perpetuates mental illness stigma 
(Knaak, Mantler, & Szeto, 2017). If there is to be change in the way mental health professionals 
view and treat people with mental illness, including other professionals with mental illness, then 
it is important to understand intergroup contact theory and how it can be applied to the situation. 
Intergroup contact theory has its roots in Allport's contact hypothesis (Pettigrew, 1998). 
In his hypothesis, Allport (1954) explained that four conditions are necessary for the intergroup 
contact to have positive effects, such as lowering stigma. The groups must have equal status 
within the contact situation; the groups must be working toward common goals; the groups must 
be cooperating with one another and not competing; and the groups must have support from 
authorities, law, or custom. When one or more of these conditions are violated, then the contact 
is hypothesized to have fewer positive effects. This was initially supported by research with 
European Americans and African Americans during desegregation in the United States. That 
said, in research over the past 50 years most studies have found positive effects from contact 
even in situations that lack one or more of the four conditions (Pettigrew, 1998). 
Pettigrew (1998) developed intergroup contact theory to build on Allport's contact 
hypothesis. He noted that a major weakness in the contact hypothesis was that it said nothing 
about the process by which contact produces change in behavior and attitudes. He provided four 
processes of change through intergroup contact: learning about the outgroup, changing behavior 
(because behavior change often precedes attitude change), generating emotional ties in the 
intergroup relationship like one sees in friendship, and providing insight about the ingroup as 
well as the outgroup. The essence of these processes is that a friendship-like relationship needs to 
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develop in order for contact to have positive effects. This theory provided a corrective to the 
contact hypothesis and previous research, which focused more on the cognitive process by which 
prejudice is reduced. This was problematic because prejudice has both cognitive and affective 
components, so to ignore the affective components is to miss half the problem. In addition, as the 
development of friendship requires repeated contact over multiple situations, intergroup contact 
theory posits that the intergroup contact must occur repeatedly over time and in multiple 
situations for prejudice to decrease and for the decrease to generalize to other people and 
situations.  
Pettigrew and colleagues (2011) more recently wrote a review of intergroup contact 
theory that included meta-analytic findings. The meta-analysis included 515 studies, both 
published and unpublished, including more than 250,000 subjects. In this review, the authors 
report that Allport’s original conditions for optimal contact facilitate the reduction of prejudice 
but are not essential. In fact, despite the fact that the studies represented a variety of contact 
conditions, 94% of the studies found that contact reduced prejudice (mean r = -.21). Multiple 
types of intergroup prejudice were studied and found to be lessened by contact including subtle 
and blatant prejudice assessed with implicit and explicit measures. The results were found to 
generalize across 38 nations and occur not only for ethnic groups but also for other groups such 
as the LGBTQ+ community, people with disabilities, and people with mental illness. As 
theorized, it was found that intergroup friendship is especially important in this process. The 
most impactful mediators of the effect are essentially affective: increased empathy and decreased 
anxiety. Negative results from contact can occur, especially when the contact was not voluntary 
and was threatening. Lastly, the authors noted that segregation such as that found between Arabs 
and Israelis in Israel and historically in the American South and apartheid South Africa have 
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historically failed and inhibited any group contact from occurring, which prevents the possible 
reduction of prejudice. 
Intergroup Contact Theory in the Client-Therapist Relationship 
The case of mental health professionals interacting with people with mental illness is an 
interesting application of intergroup contact theory in considering whether professional contact 
should reduce mental health professionals’ prejudice toward people with mental illness. There 
are many conditions that should facilitate positive contact between professionals and people with 
mental illness in a professional relationship. For example, there are generally common goals 
being worked on in a cooperative manner in such a professional relationship. Typically, authority 
supports mental health services; there are many public service campaigns to promote utilization 
of mental health services. That said, the stigma of seeking mental health services is strong, which 
could hinder or limit contact, although this effect would be more pronounced for the person with 
mental illness than the professional. Reportedly, both implicit and explicit prejudice should 
decrease as a result of contact. Even if professionals started out with lower explicit stigma 
contact should theoretically decrease implicit stigma as well. Finally, in the professional 
relationship there tend to be many contacts and not just one or two.  
In addition to the positive conditions that the professional relationship provides for 
contact, there are also some negative conditions. There's certainly not equal status between a 
mental health professional and the client; there is a clear power differential between the two with 
the mental health professional having more power. We see this in the relationship itself, where 
the client is expected to divulge sensitive personal information while the professional is not. We 
also see this in the professionals’ choice to take on a client for services or not, give homework 
outside of session, guide the session, diagnose the client, and even involuntarily hospitalize the 
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client in certain crisis situations. Furthermore, the professional relationship offers no possibility 
of friendship. This does not necessarily indicate that the professional could not experience a 
reduction in anxiety about interacting with people with mental illness nor that it couldn't increase 
empathy toward and knowledge of people with mental illness, however the professional 
relationship does not necessarily encourage their reassessment of their own group in relation to 
the other group, for example. Furthermore, ethical guidelines limit if not prohibit interaction 
between the client and psychologist outside of the therapy situation (APA, 2017), which could 
limit the generalizability of the contact’s impact. In addition, depending on the professional’s 
circumstances, the contact with people with mental illness could be perceived as nonvoluntary if 
the professional does not have control over which clients are assigned to them or if the 
professional finds the client threatening. 
All of this, however, assumes that mental health professionals do not have mental illness. 
As discussed above, this is not a safe assumption. Researchers have found that about 60% of 
psychologists, one type of mental health professional, have experienced notable depression in 
their lifetime (Pope & Tabachnick, 1994; Gilroy, Carroll, & Murra, 2002; Tay, Alcock, & Scior, 
2018). In this sense, many psychologists have occupied both the world of the professional and 
the world of the person with mental illness. With this statistic in mind, it is a surprising finding 
that mental health professionals should have the same or higher levels of stigma toward people 
with mental illness as the general population.  
If one takes a closer look at the severity indicators in the three studies that have collected 
data on psychologists’ mental illness and mental treatment, a more nuanced picture emerges 
(Pope & Tabachnick, 1994; Gilroy, Carroll, & Murra, 2002; Tay, Alcock, & Scior, 2018). Pope 
and Tabachnik found that although 61% of their sample had felt what the participant would 
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characterize as clinical depression, the number of participants who reported ever experiencing 
suicidal ideation was half that, and the number of participants who reported a psychiatric 
hospitalization or suicide attempt were only about 4% each. Gilroy and colleagues found that in 
their sample of counseling psychologists, of those who reported depressive symptoms about 69% 
reported that they were diagnosed with a mild depressive disorder such as dysthymia or 
adjustment disorder with depressed mood, while only 13% reported more than a mild depressive 
disorder. They found that 42% had had some sort of suicidal ideation with half that reporting 
more than passive suicidal ideation and less than 1% reporting a suicide attempt. Only 2% had 
reported experiencing psychiatric hospitalization. This indicates that a far smaller proportion of 
the two psychologist samples experienced what might be called a serious mental illness. Finally, 
in Tay and colleague’s study in the United Kingdom, 69.9% of the participants who reported 
their own mental illness reported only mild to moderate depression, while only 12.9% reported 
severe depression, 3.3% reported psychosis, and 1.2% bipolar disorder. This might indicate more 
of a separation between client and psychologist than the numbers originally suggest. 
The Current Study 
 In this dissertation, I gathered data about psychologists’ own mental illness and mental 
health related stigma and related it to Allport’s contact hypothesis (1954) and Pettigrew’s (1998, 
2011) intergroup contact theory. The data about psychologists’ own mental illness included 
diagnosis, mental health treatment history, and a measure of current symptoms. This is to help 
clarify the current level of mental illness in psychologists to help tease out how the 
psychologists’ own symptoms and experience of mental illness impact their stigma. Furthermore, 
this will provide updated figures of mental illness in psychologists in the United States, a 
population that has not been assessed for this since 2002. 
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 The data about psychologists’ own mental health related stigma included personal stigma 
of mental illness, personal stigma of help-seeking, self-stigma of mental illness, and self-stigma 
of mental illness. We collected data on the personal stigma of mental illness rather than the 
public stigma as items for the public stigma scales load on what attitudes participants believe 
others feel about people with mental illness, when in this study we are interested in their own 
beliefs about the same.  
 I tested the contact hypothesis by assessing for psychologists’ ingroup identification with 
other psychologists, people with mental illness, and people who use mental health services as 
well as number of hours of contact (i.e. the number of hours per week the psychologist meets 
with clients); their familiarity with mental illness in any setting (e.g. a family member with a 
mental illness or have watched a film on mental illness); measuring egalitarianism in the therapy 
relationship (more information below), as well as the psychologists’ own psychological distress.  
 Egalitarianism will act as a proxy for how clinical or professional versus friend-like the 
client-psychologist relationships are and how much the psychologist engages in power-sharing 
behaviors, which would allow for the client and psychologist to have more equal status in the 
relationship. The egalitarian relationship in therapy comes from Feminist Therapy. Brown (2010) 
stated that in the egalitarian relationship the therapist acknowledges that therapy involves an 
imbalance of power as a rule, but that he or she makes a systematic effort to make that imbalance 
as small as possible; the therapist engages in power-sharing behaviors that privilege the voice, 
knowing, and experiences of the client rather than the therapist.  
Hypotheses and Proposed Analyses 
In this dissertation, I tested several hypotheses regarding psychologists’ own mental 
illness, psychologists’ levels of mental illness stigma toward the general population, 
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psychologists’ level of stigma against psychologists with mental illness, and the application of 
intergroup contact theory as follows:  
1) I hypothesized that the more serious a psychologist’s own psychological distress, the 
higher will be their group identification with people with mental illness and with people 
who use mental health services. I predicted that the relationship between mental health 
symptom severity and group identification will be both linear and quadratic. It would be 
linear because as symptoms increase, group identification will increase as the more 
severe the symptoms are the more likely they will feel that they see themselves as like 
others with mental illness or who use mental health services. I also predicted that it will 
be quadratic as I believed that the relationship between the severity of symptoms and 
group identification will be exponential. My rationale was that lower symptom severity 
allowed for denial of symptoms and less identification, but that greater symptom severity 
was harder to deny and resulted in much higher identification. Specifically, I believed 
that there were certain severe symptoms that would greatly increase identification, such 
as history of attempted suicide, realizing one has hallucinations or delusions, or that one 
is manic – symptoms so severe one may be hospitalized. I tested this hypothesis by 
running two regressions for each identification variable. In the first regression for both 
variables I regressed mental illness severity on group identification and expected to find a 
linear relationship. In the second regression I used an exponential expression and 
expected it to be stronger than the linear expression. I further predicted that group 
identification with others with mental illness and group identification with people who 
use mental health services would be significantly correlated, and qualitatively that the 
correlation would be positive and strong. I tested this with a bivariate correlation.  
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2) I hypothesized that the more therapy sessions psychologists had attended in the last five 
years, or since obtaining their psychology license if less than 5 years previous, the greater 
the degree to which they would identify with people who use mental health services. My 
rationale was that the experience of participating in therapy recently (within the past five 
years) would increase participants’ identification with others who had had similar 
experiences, including clients. I tested this with bivariate correlations.  
3) I hypothesized that there will be a negative relationship between the degree to which 
participants identified with licensed psychologists and the degree to which they identified 
with people who use mental health services such that the more participants identified 
with licensed psychologists the less they would identify with people who use mental 
health services. My rationale behind this hypothesis ws that, in qualitative studies of 
psychologists with mental illness, those psychologists frequently felt rejected by other 
psychologists (Zeruvabel & Wright, 2012), which would make them, the psychologists 
with mental illness, identify less with psychologists at large. I tested this using bivariate 
correlations.  
4) Finally, the last hypotheses were a part of a series that I tested using four hierarchical 
regressions, one regression for each of four criterion variables: personal stigma of mental 
illness, personal stigma of help seeking, self-stigma of help-seeking, and the self-stigma 
of mental illness. In this series of four hierarchical regressions, I tested how various types 
of contact impacted mental-health-related stigma. As described in the literature review 
above, there were various types of stigma that individuals held about themselves or others 
rather than the stigma that the participants perceived others have, as we would see with 
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the public stigma of mental illness or of help-seeking. These four criterion variables 
therefore offered both breadth and specificity.  
a. In the first step of each regression, I hypothesized that simple contact (i.e., 
number of hours per week the psychologist sees clients for assessment and/or 
treatment) would predict the four criterion variables but that contact with 
important others in the life of the psychologist, such as a friend of the family, 
would predict more variance in the four criterion variables. My rationale for this 
hypothesis was that Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis stipulated that one of the 
four conditions for contact to reduce prejudice or stigma was that there should be 
equal status within the contact situation. In therapeutic or assessment settings, 
there is not equal status, whereas with personal contact, it is much more likely that 
there will be equal status. That said, I hypothesized that simply the number of 
contact hours would predict stigma as evidence has shown that even in situations 
where the four conditions were not met, contact still lowered prejudice (Pettigrew 
et al., 2011). I tested this by running two steps of a hierarchical regression. In the 
first step I tested simple contact. In the second step, I tested both simple contact 
and personal contact.  
b. Second, I hypothesized that egalitarianism in the client-psychologist relationship 
would significantly predict stigma such that the higher psychologists were in 
egalitarianism, the lower the four types of stigma would be. In addition, I 
hypothesized that egalitarianism would moderate the relationship between contact 
and stigma, such that for psychologists low in egalitarianism there would be no 
relationship between contact and the four stigma variables whereas those high in 
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egalitarianism would show a negative relationship between contact and the four 
stigma variables. My rationale behind this was that egalitarianism in the 
psychologist-client relationship represented an attitude that sought to equalize the 
power dynamics in the relationship, allowing for the two to have more equal 
status in the relationship. In this way, the fourth of Allport’s four conditions for 
contact decreasing prejudice/stigma, equal status in the interaction (1954), would 
have been met. I tested this by running a third step in the above proposed four 
hierarchical regressions with egalitarianism as predictors of the four types of 
stigmas mentioned above, then a fourth step in which the interaction between 
egalitarianism and contact was added.  
c. Third, I hypothesized that additional variance would be explained by adding 
history of having a mental illness and group identification with people who have a 
mental illness. My rationale was that psychologists with a history of receiving 
psychological services and a high level of group identification with people who 
use mental health services had met the most stringent level of contact with people 
with mental illness – they themselves had mental illness and identified with 
people who use mental health services. I tested this by adding a fifth step in the 
hierarchical regressions, with history of seeing a psychotherapist and group 
identification added as predictors.  
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS 
Participants 
Participants were 143 individuals who were 18 years of age or older, licensed 
psychologists, fluent in English, residents of the United States of America, and provide services 
(psychotherapy, psychological testing, or medication management if applicable) to 
clients/patients two or more hours per week. The sample was 69.2% identified female (n = 99; 
with n = 37 males, n = 2 transgender; and n = 5 not specified). Racially/ethnically the sample 
was 71.3% European American/White (n = 102), 1.4% Latin American/Hispanic (n = 2), 15.4% 
Asian/Asian American (n = 22), 0.7% African American/Black (n = 1), 5.6% multiracial 
American (n = 8), 0.7% Native American (n = 1), and 4.9% not specified (n = 7). When asked if 
they have a disability, 81.1% reported they did not (n = 116); 9.1% reported they had physical 
disabilities (n = 13), 6.3% reported they had a serious mental illness (n = 9); 1.4% reported 
hearing loss (n = 2); and 1.4% reported they had a disability but did not specify it (n = 2). The 
mean age was 44.91 with a range of 29-73 (SD = 11.98).  
The demographics of the sample were compared to the 2015 demographics of the health 
service psychologist population as reported by the American Psychological Association (APA; 
2016). The sample included both APA members and nonmembers. Compared to the 2015 APA 
sample in terms of percentages, the present study had more women, fewer European 
American/White, fewer Latin American/Hispanic, more Asian/Asian American, fewer African 
American, more multiracial American, and more people with at least one disability. That said, it 
should be noted that there were differences in the methodology for collecting data so results 
should be compared cautiously. See Table 1.  
 
 
35 
 
Table 1  
Demographics of licensed psychologists by survey 
Demographic Present Study 2015 APA Survey 
Female 69.2% 59.2% 
Male 25.9% 40% 
Transgender 1.4% 0.1% 
European American/White 71.3% 87.8% 
Latin American/Hispanic 1.4% 4.4% 
Asian/Asian American 15.4% 2.5% 
African American/Black 0.7% 2.6% 
Native American 0.7% <1% 
Multiracial American 5.6% 1.7% 
Disability (At least one) 18.8% 5.8% 
Note. There were differences in the methodology so results should be compared cautiously. 
 
The mean year they received their license was 2008 with a range of 1977-2019 (SD = 
10.59) and the mean hours per week providing services was 21.92 with a range of 2-45 (SD = 
10.19). Services provided included psychotherapy (85.3%; n = 122), assessment or psychological 
evaluation (67.1%; n = 96), medication management (2.8%; n = 4), and other (13.3%; n = 19). 
Examples of other services provided included rehabilitation, clinical supervision, being an expert 
witness, consultation, and case management. When asked, on average, what percentage of their 
clients/patients experience symptoms of severe psychopathology (e.g. hallucinations, delusions, 
mania, severe depression), the mean reported was 25.8 percent (SD = 23.8) with a range of 0-
100.  
Measures 
Public (personal) stigma of mental illness. Day, Edgren, and Eshleman (2007) 
developed Day’s Mental Illness Stigma scale (DMIS) to measure personal stigma toward people 
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with mental illness, that is the stigma that that the participant himself or herself holds against 
people with mental illness. The full scale used 28 items to measure seven factors: interpersonal 
anxiety, relationship disruption, poor hygiene, visibility, treatability, professional efficacy, and 
recovery. The number of items per factor varied from two (professional efficacy and recovery) to 
seven (anxiety). Items are rated on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 
(completely agree). Participants’ total score was used in this study. The original scale was 
written such that “mental illness” could be replaced by depression, bipolar, and schizophrenia as 
the developers were interested in the difference in stigma as it relates to specific conditions. For 
example, one statement was “I would find it difficult to trust someone with [a mental illness].” 
Because we were trying to keep the terminology consistent with the Level of Contact Report (see 
below) we inserted “severe mental illness” where “mental illness” is in the questions.  
 Due to concerns about survey length, we only used the 6-item relationship disruption 
factor. We considered using the anxiety and hygiene factors as well but realized that the anxiety 
and hygiene items would tap into licensed psychologists’ professional experiences with 
clients/patients rather than their personal attitudes. For example, the anxiety item “I feel anxious 
and uncomfortable when I’m around someone with [a mental illness]” has a different meaning 
for a psychologist working with clients/patients on a weekly basis because they work with people 
with a mental illness regularly. Therefore, the anxiety factor is loading on actual experiences 
rather than attitudes. The same goes for the hygiene factor. An example item: “People with 
[mental illnesses] ignore their hygiene, such as bathing and using deodorant.” Licensed 
psychologists are more likely to think about actual clients rather than relying on attitudes. In 
contrast, the relationship disruption items are written in a way that specifically ask about their 
personal attitudes toward people that would not be a client/patient. For example, “I think that a 
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personal relationship with someone with [a mental illness] would be too demanding.” The 
relationship disruption factor had good internal consistency in previous research (α = .84; Day et 
al., 2007). The internal consistency in the present study is also good (α = .87).  
Self-stigma of mental illness. Tucker and colleagues (2013) developed the 10-item Self-
Stigma of Mental Illness (SSOMI) scale to measure the self-stigma of being labeled as having a 
mental illness. This scale was developed as a parallel to the Self-Stigma of Seeking Help 
(SSOSH) Scale. Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) and include statements such as “It would make me feel inferior to have a mental 
illness.” Participants’ total score was used in this study. Half the items are reverse scored such 
that higher scores represent greater self-stigma associated with having a mental illness. Evidence 
for convergent validity was demonstrated through a strong, positive correlation with the 
modified Self-Stigma of Depression (SSD) Scale (r = .73, p < .001). Discriminant validity for the 
SSOMI comes from its small, negative correlation with self-esteem (r = -.25, p < .001). It had 
excellent internal consistency in previous research (α = .91-.92; Tucker et al., 2013). The internal 
consistency in the present study is also excellent (α = .92).  
Self-stigma of seeking help. The Self-Stigma of Seeking Help (SSOSH) scale is a 10-
item questionnaire, has a unitary factor structure and measures the stigma one might feel toward 
themselves for seeking psychological help (Vogel & Wade, 2009). Items are rated on a 5-point 
Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and include statements such as, 
“Seeking psychological help would make me feel less intelligent.” Participants’ total score was 
used in this study. The SSOSH demonstrates good construct validity through correlations with 
intentions to seek counseling, attitudes toward counseling, and the public stigma for seeking help 
(Vogel et al., 2006).  It has been shown to distinguish between those who seek help and those 
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who do not. Finally, in previous research the SSOSH demonstrated discriminant validity through 
its zero-order, non-significant correlation with self-esteem (r = .06; Vogel et al., 2006), and 
demonstrated acceptable test-retest reliability over a period of 2 months (α = .72) and had good 
internal consistency (α = .89; Vogel, Wade, & Ascheman, 2009). The internal consistency in the 
present study is excellent (α = .90).  
Degree of contact with people with mental illness. Holmes and colleagues (1999) 
developed the Level-of-Contact Report (LOCR), a 12-item measure, to get a more nuanced 
assessment of a person’s level of contact with people with mental illness than a categorical 
question of, “Do you know someone with a mental illness?” (Holmes, Corrigan, Williams, 
Canar, & Kubiak, 1999; p. 449). The LOCR lists 12 situations in which a person could have 
contact with a person with mental illness, with the level of intimacy varying. Each situation has 
been rank ordered according to level of intimacy, from the least (“I have never observed a person 
that I was aware had a severe mental illness;” rank order = 1) to medium intimacy (“I have 
observed persons with a severe mental illness on a frequent basis;” rank order = 5) to high 
intimacy (“I live with a person who has a severe mental illness;” rank order = 11; and “I have a 
severe mental illness;” rank order = 12). The person is instructed “to check all situations on the 
list that they had experienced in their lifetime” (Holmes et al., 1999; p. 450). The participant’s 
score is the number of the highest rank-order option she or he chose. For example, if they chose, 
“I live with a person who has a severe mental illness” as the option with the greatest level of 
intimacy, they would get a score of 11. Scores range from 1 to 12. The mean of rank order 
correlations summarizing interrater reliability was 0.83; which was validated with a subsequent 
sample of 100 college students (Holmes et al., 1999). 
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Psychological distress. The General Population – Clinical Outcomes in Routine 
Evaluation (GP-CORE) is a 14-item self-report measure of psychological distress for a 
nonclinical population (Sinclair, Barkham, Evans, Connell, & Audin, 2005). It was derived from 
the Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation – Outcome Measure (CORE-OM; Evans et al., 
2000; 2002), a 34-item measure designed to monitor the psychological distress of psychotherapy 
clients including well-being, problems or symptoms, functioning, and risk. It was designed to 
measure changes in severity as well as to differentiate whether a client’s symptoms are more 
similar to a clinical or non-clinical population (Sinclair et al., 2005). Responses are rated on a 5-
point Likert scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (most or all of the time; Evans et al., 2000). Items 
include statements like, “I have felt anxious or nervous” and “I have felt optimistic about my 
future” (reversed scored). Participants’ mean score was used in this study.  
In previous research, the GP-CORE demonstrated good internal consistency (α = .87) and 
excellent test-retest reliability (α = .91; Sinclair et al., 2005). The internal consistency in the 
present study was excellent (α = .90). Evidence of the convergent validity of the scale comes 
from its strong correlations with other measures of psychological distress, such as the Beck 
Depression Inventory, 2nd edition (BDI-II; r = .84) and the Symptom Checklist-90-Revised 
(SLC-90-R; r = .71). Sinclair and colleagues (2005) found that there was a significant difference 
between the GP-CORE means for their clinical (M = 2.11, SD = 0.67) and their nonclinical (M = 
1.04, SD = 0.67) samples. Cut-off scores of 1.49 for males and 1.63 for females were suggested.  
Group identification. Group identification was measured using three adaptations of a 4-
item scale developed by Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1995; Saleem et al., 2015): one 
adaptation for psychologists, one for people with mental illness, and one for people who use 
mental health services. Doosje and colleagues developed the measure to cover the cognitive, 
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evaluative, and affective aspects of identification with stems such as “I identify with other ___” 
and “I feel strong ties with ____.” Responses are rated on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Participants’ total score was used in this study. Internal 
consistency reliability was excellent in previous research (α = .90; Saleem et al., 2015). In the 
present study, internal consistency was questionable for the adaptation for people with mental 
illness (α = .60), acceptable for the adaptation for people who use mental health services (α = 
.79), and good for the adaptation for psychologists (α = .85). 
Egalitarianism. Robinson and Worrell (1991) developed the Therapy with Women Scale 
(TWS) to distinguish feminist therapy from other therapies but more specifically to measure 
power-sharing behaviors. The measure was developed from a review of the beliefs and principles 
of the feminist therapy literature (Worrell & Johnson, 2001; Rader & Gilbert, 2005). While the 
original scale included 40-items, for the purpose of this study we used two items that apply more 
broadly to power-sharing behaviors in therapy with all clients, not just women. Responses are 
rated on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Internal 
reliability for the full 40-item scale was high (α = .91-.94; Robinson and Worrell, 1991; Rader & 
Gilbert, 2005). Six additional items were generated by Lily Mathison and Nathaniel Wade based 
on Brown’s (2010) concept of the egalitarian relationship in therapy. Internal consistency for the 
developed scale in the present study was unacceptable (α = .37). For this and other reasons 
described in the results chapter that follows, the Egalitarianism Scale was not used for the 
analyses.  
Personal experience with mental illness and mental health treatment and demographic 
questionnaire. Participants reported their age, gender, race/ethnicity, whether they have a 
disability, years since receiving psychology license, hours per week they spend providing direct 
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clinical services to people with mental illness, the type of services they provide, and the 
percentage of clients/patients seen experience symptoms of severe psychopathology (e.g. 
hallucinations, delusions, mania, severe depression). Participants then indicated if they have ever 
had a mental illness, if so, the most severe mental health diagnosis they have had, if they have 
ever been treated for mental illness, if so, from whom/where (select all that apply: 
psychotherapist, primary care medical provider, psychiatrist, emergency department, acute 
inpatient psychiatric unit, residential treatment, and other, please specify). Then they reported if 
they have received psychotherapy, how many sessions they have had in the last 5 years or since 
receiving their psychology license, and if they have ever been on psychoactive medication.  
Attention Checks. Random responses from even 5% of participants can have a significant 
impact on observed correlations (Credé, 2010). It is highly recommended that researchers make 
every attempt to identify and eliminate such random responders (Osborne & Blanchard, 2011; 
Tucker, 2013). I attempted to identify random responding by requiring the participant to answer 
correctly an item prompting a specified response (e.g. “Please select Strongly Disagree for this 
item”). 
Survey Procedures 
First, the study was approved by Iowa State University’s Institutional Review Board 
(IRB). Originally, the procedure was to email the survey to a randomly selected sample of 4000 
licensed psychologists who were members of the American Psychological Association (APA) 
using the APA Membership Directory. This was a similar procedure to that used by Gilroy and 
colleagues (2002) with their survey of psychologists back in the 1990’s. However, when we 
contacted APA to request permission to do so, we were informed this was not an approved use of 
the directory at this point in time. APA recommended a marketing company to contact for 
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licensed psychologists’ contact information. Unfortunately, when we contacted that company, 
they informed us that they generally sold licensed psychologists’ mailing addresses, and that they 
could not guarantee the quality of their lists of email addresses. Their email lists were also 
prohibitively expensive.  
Stymied on multiple fronts, we nevertheless carried on. We decided we would recruit 
research participants from several APA Division Listservs. APA has 54 divisions; options to 
contact were decided based on appropriateness for inclusion including likelihood that a majority 
of subscribers would be licensed psychologists in practice. For example, Division 10 
(Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts) was not considered a good option to meet 
this criterion. Divisions contacted included Division 12 – Clinical Psychology, Division 17 – 
Counseling Psychology, Division 22 – Rehabilitation Psychology, Division 29 – Advancement 
of Psychotherapy, Division 36 – Religion and Spirituality, Division 40 – Clinical 
Neuropsychology (both the general ListServ and the Women of Neuropsychology ListServ), 
Division 49 – Group Psychology, Division 50 – Addiction Psychology, and Division 55 – 
Psychopharmacology. We also contacted three state psychological associations to request that 
they post our survey to their ListServ including the Iowa Psychological Association (IPA), the 
New Mexico Psychological Association (NMPA), and the Texas Psychological Association 
(TPA).  
As requested by our IRB Committee, we first contacted the moderators of the ListServs 
to ask to post the request for participants. One Division (12) denied the request completely. Eight 
division ListServs and one state association (IPA) allowed us to post the request, usually with the 
requirement that a member be the one to post. One Division (40 – General) denied the request to 
post on the ListServ, but agreed to post the request for participants on the Division’s Facebook 
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page. Finally, one Division (39) and two state associations (NMPA and TPA) were contacted 
without response from the moderator. Whenever possible, we posted to the ListServs on two 
occasions over the course of the fall of 2019.  
For all ListServ and similar postings, an IRB approved description of the study as well as 
a link to the survey were emailed to psychologists inviting them to participate. The survey 
included the above described measures and questions. Finally, the participant was offered a 
chance to enter a drawing to win one of four $50 Amazon gift cards.  
Power Analyses 
 I conducted a power analysis to determine the necessary participants to find a significant 
effect on the t-test (two-tailed) associated with one predictor variable within the overall 
regression analyses should one exist. Through G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007), I explored the minimum number of participants needed to find a significant small and 
medium effect on a single predictor using the following criteria: alpha = .05, power = .80, and 7 
predictor variables. To detect a medium effect, I would need to include 55 participants. To detect 
a small effect, I would need to include 395 participants.   
44 
 
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
Psychologists’ Own Mental Illness and Mental Health Treatment 
Participants were asked about their own history of mental illness and mental health 
treatment. When asked if they had ever had a mental illness, 72.7% answered yes (n = 104), 
23.1% answered no (n = 33), and 4.2% did not answer (n = 6). Most severe mental health 
diagnosis(es) specified included adjustment disorder (2.8%; n = 4); a depressive disorder (35.0%; 
n = 50) including Major Depressive Disorder and Dysthymia, bipolar disorder (2.8%; n = 4); an 
anxiety disorder (21.7%; n = 31) including Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Social Anxiety, and 
Panic Disorder; Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (2.8%; n = 4); Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
(9.8%; n = 14); a substance use disorder (2.8%; n = 4) including Alcohol Use Disorder; an eating 
disorder (4.9%; n = 7) including Anorexia, Bulimia, and Binge Eating Disorder; Dissociative 
Identity Disorder (0.7%; n = 1); Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (0.7%; n = 1); four 
participants did not specify the disorder (2.8%). Of note, 10.5% (n = 15) specified more than one 
diagnosis. See Table 2.   
Participants completed a measure of psychological symptoms for the general population, 
the General Population – Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation (GP-CORE). Scores on the 
GP-CORE are calculated as the mean of the responses on 14 items and range from 0-4, 4 
indicating the worst symptoms. The mean GP-CORE score for the sample was 1.04, ranging 
from 0.14 to 2.71 (SD = .59). As the cut-off scores for the GP-CORE differ based on gender 
(Sinclair et al., 2005; 1.49 for men, 1.63 for women), means for each gender were also 
calculated. For men the mean was 1.08 (SD = .63, IQR = .61-1.43) and for women 1.03 (SD = 
.59, IQR = .57-1.50). Even the 75th percentiles for the men (1.43) and women (1.50) in this study 
are lower than the clinical cut-offs.  
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Table 2 
Mental Illnesses Reported by Licensed Psychologists (n = 104) 
Type of Mental Illness n % 
Depressive Disorder 50 35.0 
Anxiety Disorder 31 21.7 
PTSD 14 9.8 
Eating Disorder 7 4.9 
Adjustment Disorder 4 2.8 
Bipolar Disorder 4 2.8 
OCD 4 2.8 
Substance Use Disorder 4 2.8 
DID 1 0.7 
ADHD 1 0.7 
Total % exceeds 100% owing to comorbidities. PTSD = Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, OCD = 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, DID = Dissociative Identity Disorder, ADHD = Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.  
 
When asked if they had ever received treatment for a mental illness, 76.2% of 
participants answered yes (n = 109), 19.6% answered no (n = 28), and 4.2% did not answer (n = 
6). Participants selected from whom they had received treatment including any psychotherapist 
(74.8%; n = 107), a master’s level psychotherapist (41.3%; n = 59), a doctoral level 
psychotherapist (60.8%; n = 87), a primary care medical provider (32.2%; n = 46), a psychiatric 
specialist such as a psychiatrist or psychiatric nurse practitioner (36.4%; n = 52), an emergency 
department (2.1%; n = 3), an acute inpatient psychiatric unit (3.5%; n = 5), a residential facility 
(3.5%; n = 5), or other (2.1%; n = 3) including an acupuncturist, a partial hospitalization 
program, and electroconvulsive therapy. See Table 3. As a note, 56.6% of participants (n = 81) 
reported receiving treatment from more than one of the above sources. Participants reported the 
number of psychotherapy sessions they had received in the last five years or since receiving their 
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psychology license. The mean number was 25.5 (SD = 52.7) with a range of 0-250. When the 
participants were asked if they had ever been on psychoactive medication for a mental illness, 
53.1% indicated yes (n = 76), 42.7% indicated no (n = 61), and 4.2% did not respond (n = 6).  
Table 3 
Treatment for Mental Illness Reported by Licensed Psychologists (n = 143) 
Type of Treatment for Mental Illness n % 
Any Treatment 109 76.2 
Psychotherapy (Any) 107 74.8 
Psychotherapy (Doctoral Level Clinician) 87 60.8 
Psychotherapy (Master’s Level Clinician) 59 41.3 
Psychoactive Medication 76 53.1 
Psychiatric Specialist 52 36.4 
Primary Care Medical Provider 46 32.2 
Acute Inpatient Psychiatric Unit 5 3.5 
Residential Facility 5 3.5 
Emergency Department 3 2.1 
Other 3 2.1 
Total % exceeds 100% owing to receiving treatment from multiple sources.  
 
Development of Egalitarianism Scale 
I planned to conduct an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with principle axis factoring 
and a Direct Oblimin (oblique) rotation. As a first step, I used the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
measure of sampling adequacy and found the value was .51. KMO values range from 0 to 1, with 
higher numbers indicating better sampling adequacy. Howard (2016) indicated the KMO should 
be above .60 before performing an EFA, as this indicates latent factors may be present and an 
EFA would be appropriate. Our scale did not meet this cut-off recommendation. In addition, the 
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internal consistency reliability of the items was found to be unacceptable (Cronbach’s α = .37). I 
conducted the same analyses on the two items taken from the Therapy with Women Scale (TWS) 
to see if it would be appropriate to use just those items in lieu of the eight-item scale given to 
participants. The KMO was also too low to perform an EFA at only .50 and the internal 
consistency was unacceptable (α = .49). It was therefore decided that the Egalitarianism Scale 
would not be used in the analyses.  
Missing Data 
I searched my data for missing values for all of the variables that were included in the 
analyses to follow. For the most part, there were very few variables with missing data. In total, 
three variables had missing data: self-stigma of seeking help (SSOSH), self-stigma of mental 
illness (SSOMI), and number of hours per week seeing clients. For those variables, the 
percentage of missing data ranged from 0.7% (n = 142; SSOSH) to 3.5% (n = 138; Number of 
hours per week seeing clients). When data were missing, the cases were excluded listwise.  
Preliminary Analyses 
Previous literature has found that stigma can vary by gender (Vogel et al., 2006). As a 
result, I conducted independent samples t-test on DMIS, SSOSH, and SSOMI scores by gender. 
DMIS scores did not differ significantly between women (M = 16.7, SD = 6.20) and men (M = 
17.8, SD = 7.86), t(134) = .791, p = .430. Neither did SSOSH scores differ between women (M = 
19.2, SD = 6.94) and men (M = 21.1, SD = 8.61), t(134) = 1.27, p = .208, nor SSOMI scores 
between women (M = 27.8, SD = 7.76) and men (M = 28.6, SD = 7.76), t(134) = .506, p = .615. 
Means, standard deviations, possible scale ranges, and bivariate correlations for the main 
variables are presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Zero-Order Correlation Matrix, Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges      
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Personal Stigma —          
2. Self-Stigma of Seeking Help .13 —         
3. Self-Stigma of Mental Illness .37*** .55** —        
4. Group ID, Mental Illness -.33*** .05 -.21** —       
5. Group ID, Service Users -.18* -.35*** -.20* .47*** —      
6. Group ID, Psychologists -.06 -.25** -.14 -.05 .13 —     
7. Psychological Distress .13 .46*** .25** .11 -.20* -.50*** —    
8. Time Since Licensed .39*** -.01 .09 -.33*** -.16 .24** -.08 —   
9. Hours Providing Services .03 .15 -.08 .10 -.04 -.03 .09 -.02 —  
10. Own Therapy Sessions -.03 -.10 .09 .17* .25** .07 .05 -.10 .10 — 
M 16.99 19.69 28.11 11.27 13.75 17.79 1.045 12.09 21.92 19.32 
SD 6.77 7.38 7.84 2.75 3.17 2.66 .594 10.6 10.2 47.9 
Sample Range 6-36 10-44 10-49 4-17 4-20 4-20 .14-2.71 1-43 2-45 0-250 
Note. N = 136-143. *p < . 05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
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Main Analyses  
 Hypothesis 1: Psychologists’ own psychological distress and group identification. I 
hypothesized that the more serious a psychologist’s own psychological distress, the higher would 
be their group identification with people with mental illness and with people who use mental 
health services. To examine the relationship between psychologists’ own psychological distress 
and group identification with people with a mental illness (GIMI) and people who use mental 
health services (GIU), I conducted four regression analyses: two with each type of group 
identification as predictor variables. Because I predicted that the relationship between 
psychological distress and group identification would be more likely to be exponential than 
linear, for each type of group identification, I tested both a linear and an exponential regression 
model. 
Before the regressions were conducted, the assumptions of normality and 
homoscedasticity were checked, and the plots were examined for outliers for each dependent 
variable. To check if the residuals of the regression followed a normal distribution, Predicted-
Probability (P-P) plots were inspected. The P-P plots for both GIMI and GIU were normal. To 
check for homoscedasticity, scatterplots of the regression standardized predicted values and 
regression standardized residuals were inspected. The scatterplots indicated homoscedasticity for 
both GIMI and GIU. An examination of the data plots indicated no outliers.  
 The linear and exponential regressions were then conducted. First, I conducted the 
regressions with GIMI as the dependent variable and psychological distress as a predictor 
variable. Neither the linear regression model, F(1,141) = 1.71, p = .193, nor the exponential 
regression model, F(1,141) = 2.70, p = .103, with GIMI as the dependent variable were 
significant. Then, I conducted the regressions with GIU as the dependent variable and 
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psychological distress as a predictor variable. Both the linear regression, F(1,141) = 5.60, p = 
.019, and the exponential regression, F(1,141) = 4.32, p = .039, were significant. In both cases 
more severe psychological distress significantly predicted lower GIU; linear regression (R2 = 
.038, B = -1.04, SE = .441, β = -.195, p = .019), exponential regression (R2 = .030, B = -.077, SE 
= .037, β = -.172, p = .039,). See Table 5. These results do not support my hypothesis. According 
to these findings, psychological distress are not related to therapists identifying with those who 
have mental illness. Furthermore, although psychological distress are related to therapists 
identifying with those who use mental health services, the relationship is in the opposite 
direction of what I hypothesized: those with greater psychological distress reported less 
identification with those who use psychological services.   
Table 5 
Linear and Exponential Regression Analyses of Psychological distress Predicting Group 
Identifications. 
Dependent Variable Model B SE β R2 F p 
Group ID, Mental Illness Linear .508 .388 .110 .012 1.71 .193 
 Exponential .066 .040 .137 .019 2.70 .103 
Group ID, Service Users Linear -1.04 .441 -.195 .038 5.60 .019 
 Exponential -.077 .037 -.172 .030 4.32 .039 
Note. Predictor variable = psychological distress. SE = standard error of B.  
 
 
 A bivariate correlation was used to test if group identification with others with mental 
illness and group identification with people who use mental health services would be 
significantly correlated. The correlation was, indeed, significant (r = .47, p < .001). This 
indicates that the more participants identified with others with mental illness the more they 
identified with people who use mental health services. 
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 Hypothesis 2: Group identification and psychologists’ own psychotherapy. A 
bivariate correlation was used to examine if the number of therapy sessions psychologists had 
attended in the last five years—or since obtaining their psychology license if less than 5 years 
previous—would be related to the degree to which they would identify with people who use 
mental health services. The correlation was, in fact, significant (r = .25, p = .003). This indicates 
that the more therapy sessions participants had attended, the more they tended to identify with 
people who use mental health services. 
 A hierarchical regression analysis was done to further explore this relationship, 
specifically to parcel out if the relationship with GIU was simply associated with receiving any 
treatment of mental illness or if it was specific to number of therapy sessions in the last five 
years or since obtaining their psychology license. In Step 1, whether or not the participant had 
ever received treatment for a mental illness was entered as the predictor variable with GIU as the 
dependent variable. Step 1 was not significant, F(1,135) = 3.67, p = .058. In Step 2, number of 
therapy sessions was added as a predictor variable. Step 2 was significant, F(1,134) = 8.94, p = 
.003, with more therapy sessions (B = .016, SE = .005, β = .252, p = .003) significantly 
predicting higher GIU, but not whether or not the participant had ever received treatment for a 
mental illness (B = .871, SE = .650, β = .113, p = .183). Therapy sessions accounted for 6.1% of 
the variance. See Table 6.  
 Hypothesis 3: Group identification with psychologists and people who use mental 
health services. A bivariate correlation was used to test if a negative relationship existed 
between the degree to which participants identified with being a licensed psychologist and the 
degree to which they identified with people who use mental health services, such that the more 
participants identified with being a licensed psychologist the less they would identify with  
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Table 6 
Regression Analysis Predicting Group Identification with People Who Use Mental Health 
Services. 
Predictor B SE β p R2 DR2 F p 
Step 1     .026 .026 3.67 .058 
Own treatment  1.26 .656 .163 .058     
Step 2     .087 .061 8.94 .003 
Own treatment .871 .650 .113 .183     
Own therapy sessions .016 .005 .252 .003     
Note. SE = standard error of B.  
 
people who use mental health services. Contrary to my hypothesis, the correlation was not 
significant (r = .13, p = .13). In addition, there was not a significant correlation between group 
identification with people who have a mental illness and group identification with being a 
psychologist (r = -.05, p = .52). That said, there was a related finding that supports the idea 
behind the hypothesis. I found a significant, negative correlation between participants’ 
psychological distress and their group identification with psychologists (r = -.43, p <.001). This 
indicates that as participants’ psychological distress grew more severe, they identified less with 
other psychologists.  
 Hypothesis 4: Contact and various types of stigma. To examine the relationship 
between psychologists’ contact with people with mental illness and their levels of mental health 
stigma, I conducted a series of hierarchical regressions. Initially, the intention had been to 
conduct four series of hierarchical regressions, one with each of four types of stigma as criterion 
variables: personal stigma of mental illness, personal stigma of help seeking, self-stigma of 
seeking help, and the self-stigma of mental illness. Unfortunately, one of the criterion variables, 
the personal stigma of seeking help, had to be dropped from analyses because the scale 
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estimating it, the Personal Stigma scale, was deemed to have poor psychometrics. As a result, I 
only conducted three hierarchical regressions. It had also been the intention to include both 
egalitarianism with clients and an interaction between egalitarianism and contact. Regretfully, 
the Egalitarianism Scale was also dropped from analyses due to concerns about poor 
psychometrics. As a result, the two steps testing egalitarianism were eliminated.  
 Before the hierarchical regressions were conducted, the assumptions of normality, 
homoscedasticity, and linearity were checked, and the plots were examined for outliers for each 
dependent variable. To check if the residuals of the regression followed a normal distribution 
Predicted-Probability (P-P) plots were inspected. The P-P plots for DMIS, SSOSH, and SSOMI 
were normal. To check for homoscedasticity scatterplots of the regression standardized predicted 
values and regression standardized residuals were inspected. The scatterplots indicated 
homoscedasticity for DMIS, SSOSH, and SSOMI. An examination of the data plots indicated no 
outliers. In addition, the variance inflation factor (VIF) and the condition indexes were 
examined. VIF for all of the analyses were between 1.00 and 1.24, meaning that the standard 
error for the coefficients were at its highest 1.24 times larger than if the two had been completely 
uncorrelated (O’Brien, 2007). This is below the typical cut-off value of five considered to be 
cause for concern (Menard, 1995). Additionally, no condition index was above 30, consistent 
with the data screening procedures recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001). Regressions 
were considered appropriate in the present analysis and the significance of regression 
coefficients was considered interpretable.   
 Five-step hierarchical regressions were run for each of three separate dependent 
variables: personal stigma of mental illness, self-stigma of help seeking, and self-stigma of 
mental illness. Hours per week spent providing clinical services was entered at Step 1 of the 
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regressions to test participants’ simple contact with people with mental illness. Participants’ 
degree of contact, a measure designed to assess for different types of contact with people with 
mental illness, was entered at Step 2. Reported history of mental illness and reported number of 
therapy sessions over the last five years or since receiving license were added at Step 3. Group 
identification with people with mental illness was added at Step 4 to test for personal experience 
and identification with people with mental illness. Group identification with people who use 
mental health services was added at Step 5. Intercorrelations among the regression variables 
were reported in Table 4. 
 Personal stigma of mental illness. As noted in Table 7 below, for personal stigma of 
mental illness the hierarchical regression revealed that at Step 1, number of clinical hours per 
week did not contribute significantly to the regression model, F(1,135) = .154, p = .696. 
Likewise, introducing degree of contact at Step 2 did not contribute significantly to the model, 
F(1,134) = .141, p = .708, neither did adding reported history of mental illness or number of 
therapy sessions in the last five years at Step 3, F(2,132) = 2.80, p = .065. The addition of group 
identification with people with mental illness at Step 4, however, did contribute significantly, 
F(1,131) = 10.4, p = .002 (B = -.721, SE = .223, β = -.296, p = .002) and accounted for 7.0% of 
the variation in personal stigma of mental illness. The addition of group identification with 
people who use mental health services at Step 5, did not contributed significantly, F(1,130) = 
.286, p = .594. Together, the five independent variables accounted for 11.5% of the variance in 
personal stigma of mental illness. In short, it appears that those who identify more strongly with 
those who have a mental illness also hold less stigma toward that group.  
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Table 7 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Personal Stigma of Mental Illness 
Predictor B SE β P R2 DR2 F p 
Step 1     .001 .001 .154 .70 
Hours Providing Services .02 .06 .034 .696     
Step 2     .002 .001 .141 .71 
Hours Providing Services .02 .06 .032 .708     
Degree of Contact .14 .38 .032 .708     
Step 3     .043 .041 2.80 .065 
Hours Providing Services .03 .06 .038 .654     
Degree of Contact .11 .38 .024 .778     
Own Mental Illness -3.18 1.37 -.203 .021     
Own Therapy Sessions .001 .012 .008 .929     
Step 4     .113 .070 10.41 .002 
Hours Providing Services .04 .06 .058 .487     
Degree of Contact .18 .37 .041 .617     
Own Mental Illness -1.28 1.45 -.082 .377     
Own Therapy Sessions .005 .012 .033 .701     
Group ID, Mental Illness -.721 .223 -.296 .002     
Step 5     .115 .002 .286 .59 
Hours Providing Services .034 .056 .052 .539     
Degree of Contact .183 .37 .041 .617     
Own Mental Illness -1.40 1.47 -.089 .342     
Own Therapy Sessions .006 .012 .045 .613     
Group ID, Mental Illness -.66 .25 -.272 .009     
Group ID, Service Users -.111 .21 -.052 .594     
Note. SE = standard error of B.  
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Self-stigma of seeking help. As noted in Table 8, for self-stigma of seeking help the 
hierarchical regression revealed at Step 1 that the number of clinical hours per week did not 
contribute significantly to the regression model, F(1,135) = 1.40, p = .239. Similarly, introducing 
the degree of contact at Step 2 did not contribute significantly to the model, F(1,134) = .361, p = 
.549, neither did adding reported history of mental illness or number of therapy sessions in the 
last five years at Step 3, F(2,132) = 1.69, p = .188. In Step 4, the addition of group identification 
with people who have a mental illness also did not explain a significant amount of the variance 
in self-stigma of seeking help, F(1,131) = .147, p = .702. 
The addition of group identification with people who use mental health services at Step 5, 
however, did contribute significantly, F(1,130) = 22.46, p < .001, and accounted for 14.2% of the 
variation in self-stigma of seeking help. In addition, even though group identification with 
people who have mental illness was not a significant predictor in Step 4 (B = .099, SE = .257, β = 
.037, p = .702), it was a significant predictor in Step 5 (B = .665, SE = .266, β = .248, p = .014) 
along with group identification with people who use mental health services (B = -1.05, SE = 
.221, β = -.440, p < .001). When entered into the model together, these two predictors act in 
opposite directions: group identification with those who have a mental illness is positively 
associated with the self-stigma of seeking help, whereas group identification with those who use 
mental health services is negatively associated with the self-stigma of seeking help. This 
indicates that those who identify more with those who have a mental illness, after controlling for 
those who identify with those who use services, report greater self-stigma of seeking help. In 
contrast, those who identify more with those who use services report less self-stigma of seeking 
help. Together, the six independent variables accounted for 18.0% of the variance in self-stigma 
of seeking help. 
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Table 8 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Self-Stigma of Seeking Help 
Predictor B SE β P R2 DR2 F p 
Step 1     .010 .010 1.40 .24 
Hours Providing Services .074 .063 .101 .239     
Step 2     .013 .003 .361 .55 
Hours Providing Services .073 .063 .099 .251     
Degree of Contact .252 .419 .052 .601     
Step 3     .038 .025 1.69 .19 
Hours Providing Services .080 .063 .109 .206     
Degree of Contact .278 .417 .057 .506     
Own Mental Illness 2.01 1.51 .116 .187     
Own Therapy Sessions -.020 .013 -.134 .129     
Step 4     .039 .001 .147 .70 
Hours Providing Services .078 .063 .107 .219     
Degree of Contact .27 .42 .055 .525     
Own Mental Illness 1.75 1.66 .101 .295     
Own Therapy Sessions -.021 .013 -.137 .123     
Group ID, Mental Illness .099 .26 .037 .702     
Step 5     .180 .142 22.5 .000 
Hours Providing Services .040 .059 .055 .498     
Degree of Contact .27 .39 .055 .490     
Own Mental Illness .640 1.56 .037 .682     
Own Therapy Sessions -.005 .013 -.035 .678     
Group ID, Mental Illness .67 .27 .248 .014     
Group ID, Service Users -1.05 .22 -.440 .000     
Note. SE = standard error of B.  
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Self-stigma of mental illness. As noted in Table 9, for self-stigma of mental illness, the 
hierarchical regression revealed that neither Step 1, number of clinical hours per week, nor Step 
2, degree of contact contributed significantly to the regression model, F(1,135) = .622, p = .432; 
F(1,134) = 3.73, p = .056, respectively. Similarly, introducing reported history of mental illness 
and number of therapy session in the last five years at Step 3, F(2,132) = 2.163, p = .119, did not 
add significantly to the model. The addition of group identification with people with mental 
illness at Step 4 was significant, F(1,131) = 4.32, p = .040, and accounted for 3.0% of the 
variation in self-stigma of mental illness. When all five independent variables were included in 
Step 4 of the regression model, degree of contact (added in Step 2) became a significant 
predictor of self-stigma of mental illness (B = .85, SE = .42, β = .169, p = .045) along with group 
identification with people with mental illness (B = -.54, SE = .26, β = -.193, p = .040). It seems 
the more personal a psychologists’ contact is with people with mental illness the more self-
stigma of mental illness they have. The addition of group identification with people who use 
mental health services at Step 5, did not contributed significantly, F(1,130) = 3.53, p = .063. 
Oddly, group identification with people who use mental health services was not itself a 
significant predictor of self-stigma of mental illness in this step, neither was group identification 
with people who use mental health services, but degree of contact and number of therapy 
sessions in the last five years were significant. Together, the six independent variables accounted 
for 11.6% of the variance in self-stigma of mental illness. 
Follow-up Analyses 
Psychological distress and stigma. I was concerned that the variable used in the above 
hierarchical regressions to indicate whether or not a participant had a mental illness or not, a 
categorical variable, may not have encapsulated the concept of interest to an adequate degree. 
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Table 9 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Self-Stigma of Mental Illness 
Predictor B SE β P R2 DR2 F p 
Step 1     .005 .005 .622 .432 
Hours Providing Services -.052 .065 -.068 .432     
Step 2     .032 .027 3.73 .056 
Hours Providing Services -.057 .065 -.074 .383     
Degree of Contact .830 .430 .164 .056     
Step 3     .062 .031 2.16 .119 
Hours Providing Services -.063 .065 -.083 .330     
Degree of Contact .80 .43 .158 .064     
Own Mental Illness -2.68 1.55 -.070 .453     
Own Therapy Sessions .023 .014 .146 .092     
Step 4     .092 .030 4.32 .040 
Hours Providing Services -.054 .064 -.070 .404     
Degree of Contact .85 .42 .169 .045     
Own Mental Illness -1.26 1.68 -.070 .453     
Own Therapy Sessions .023 .014 .146 .092     
Group ID, Mental Illness -.54 .26 -.193 .040     
Step 5     .116 .024 3.53 .063 
Hours Providing Services -.070 .064 -.092 .277     
Degree of Contact .85 .42 .169 .043     
Own Mental Illness -1.73 1.68 -.097 .304     
Own Therapy Sessions .030 .014 .188 .035     
Group ID, Mental Illness -.30 .29 -.106 .304     
Group ID, Service Users -.446 .24 -.181 .063     
Note. SE = standard error of B.  
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This was underscored by the fact that psychologists’ own mental illness did not 
significantly predict any of the stigma variables in the above analyses. In line with previous 
studies (Pope & Tabachnick, 1994; Gilroy, Carroll, & Murra, 2002; Tay, Alcock, & Scior, 2018), 
a large proportion of my sample reported experiencing a mental illness at some point in their 
lives. That said, I had hoped that I might be able to tease out whether or not participants had 
severe mental illness and determine whether that would impact their level of stigma. I had hoped 
that in gathering the participants’ most severe diagnosis I would be able to create a variable that 
reflected whether or not participants had had a severe mental illness or not. Unfortunately, 
participants’ responses did not contain enough detail. I considered whether there might be 
another way to estimate severity of mental illness. Even though it is not an estimate of severity of 
symptoms over a participant’s lifetime, we did have a measure of severity of current 
psychological distress. I, therefore, decided to rerun the three hierarchical regressions using 
current psychological distress in lieu of the categorical self-reported mental illness variable in a 
post hoc analysis.  
 The substitution of psychological distress did not change the results for personal stigma 
of mental illness (see Table 10), but it did for self-stigma of seeking help (see Table 11) and self-
stigma of mental illness (see Table 12). The addition of psychological distress at Step 3 
contributed significantly to the model predicting self-stigma of seeking help, F(2,133) = 18.18, p 
< .001 (B = .557, SE = .095, β = .450, p < .001), and accounted for 21.2% of the variation in self-
stigma of seeking help. Together, the six independent variables accounted for 29.9% of the 
variance in self-stigma of seeking help. Furthermore, the addition of psychological distress at 
Step 3 contributed significantly to the model predicting self-stigma of mental illness, F(2,133) = 
4.786, p = .01 (B = .304, SE = .107, β = .236, p = .005), and accounted for 6.5% of the variation 
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Table 10 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Personal Stigma of Mental Illness. 
Predictor B SE β P R2 DR2 F p 
Step 1     .001 .001 .089 .766 
Hours Providing Services .017 .056 .026 .766     
Step 2     .002 .001 .123 .726 
Hours Providing Services .016 .057 .024 .780     
Degree of Contact .133 .380 .030 .726     
Step 3     .013 .012 .780 .461 
Hours Providing Services .013 .057 .019 .825     
Degree of Contact .111 .380 .025 .772     
Psychological Distress 1.16 .973 .103 .236     
Own Therapy Sessions -.005 .012 -.038 .665     
Step 4     .128 .115 17.4 .000 
Hours Providing Services .029 .054 .043 .599     
Degree of Contact .168 .360 .038 .641     
Psychological Distress 1.60 .925 .143 .085     
Own Therapy Sessions .003 .011 .019 .816     
Group ID, Mental Illness -.847 .203 -.348 .000     
Step 5     .128 .000 .002 .968 
Hours Providing Services .029 .055 .044 .600     
Degree of Contact .168 .362 .038 .643     
Psychological Distress 1.61 .968 .144 .098     
Own Therapy Sessions .003 .012 .019 .829     
Group ID, Mental Illness -.851 .231 -.350 .000     
Group ID, Service Users .009 .211 .004 .968     
Note. SE = standard error of B.  
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Table 11 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Self-Stigma of Seeking Help. 
Predictor B SE β P R2 DR2 F p 
Step 1     .010 .010 1.40 .232 
Hours Providing Services .007 .006 .102 .232     
Step 2     .013 .003 .363 .548 
Hours Providing Services .005 .006 .100 .245     
Degree of Contact .025 .042 .052 .548     
Step 3     .225 .212 18.2 .000 
Hours Providing Services .005 .006 .075 .332     
Degree of Contact .014 .037 .029 .705     
Psychological Distress .557 .095 .450 .000     
Own Therapy Sessions -.002 .001 -.130 .092     
Step 4     .226 .001 .102 .750 
Hours Providing Services .005 .006 .073 .946     
Degree of Contact .014 .037 .028 .715     
Psychological Distress .554 .096 .447 .000     
Own Therapy Sessions -.002 .001 -.134 .088     
Group ID, Mental Illness .007 .021 .025 .750     
Step 5     .299 .073 13.6 .000 
Hours Providing Services .003 .005 .046 .540     
Degree of Contact .017 .036 .036 .626     
Psychological Distress .453 .096 .336 .000     
Own Therapy Sessions -.001 .001 -.065 .397     
Group ID, Mental Illness .046 .023 .173 .045     
Group ID, Service Users -.077 .021 -.326 .000     
Note. SE = standard error of B.  
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Table 12 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Self-Stigma of Mental Illness 
Predictor B SE β P R2 DR2 F p 
Step 1     .006 .006 .779 .379 
Hours Providing Services -.006 .006 -.075 .379     
Step 2     .032 .026 3.66 .058 
Hours Providing Services -.006 .006 -.083 .329     
Degree of Contact .082 .043 .162 .058     
Step 3     .097 .065 4.79 .010 
Hours Providing Services -.008 .006 -.112 .182     
Degree of Contact .076 .042 .150 .072     
Psychological Distress .304 .107 .236 .005     
Own Therapy Sessions .001 .001 .089 .285     
Step 4     .158 .061 9.93 .002 
Hours Providing Services -.007 .006 -.094 .246     
Degree of Contact .081 .040 .160 .049     
Psychological Distress .341 .104 .265 .001     
Own Therapy Sessions .002 .001 .131 .111     
Group ID, Mental Illness -.071 .023 -.255 .002     
Step 5     .164 .006 .885 .349 
Hours Providing Services -.008 .006 -.102 .213     
Degree of Contact .082 .041 .162 .046     
Psychological Distress .312 .109 .242 .005     
Own Therapy Sessions .002 .001 .150 .077     
Group ID, Mental Illness -.059 .026 -.214 .023     
Group ID, Service Users -.022 .024 -.091 .349     
Note. SE = standard error of B.  
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in self-stigma of mental illness. Together, the six independent variables accounted for 16.4% of 
the variance in self-stigma of mental illness. 
Psychological distress, group identification, and self-stigma of seeking help. So far, 
the results of my analyses related to psychological distress, group identification, and the self-
stigma of seeking help have created a complicated picture. I found that as psychological distress 
increased group identification with people who use mental health services (GIU) decreased. I 
also found that as the self-stigma of seeking help increased, GIU decreased. Finally, a reference 
to the zero-order correlation matrix indicated that as psychological distress increased, so did 
GIU. I explored a possible mediating effect (post hoc) to further explore these results. I 
examined the possibility that greater psychological distress might make the stigma of seeking 
help more salient which in turn might encourage people to distance themselves from others who 
seek services. So, instead of causing people to identify more with those who use mental health 
services, greater psychological distress might make people more aware of the stigma that 
surrounds seeking help, which in turn might motivate them to avoid associations with seeking 
help, such as identifying with people who use mental health services. 
Because the data were available, I tested a post hoc mediation model to see if the self-
stigma of seeking help (SSOSH) accounted for the relationship between psychological distress 
(GP-CORE) and identification with people who use mental health services. The PROCESS 
macro for SPSS was used to test the mediation model (Hayes, 2013). A bootstrapping technique 
(5,000 resamples) generated 95% confidence interval estimates of the direct and indirect 
relationships, which were interpreted as significant if they did not include zero. As we know 
from the previous analyses, greater psychological distress predicted less group identification with 
users of mental health service (B = -1.02, SE = .437, p = .021). Psychological distress also 
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significantly predicted greater self-stigma of seeking help (B = 5.65, SE = .931, p < .001). 
Furthermore, greater self-stigma significantly predicted less group identification with users of 
mental health service (B = -.140, SE = .0380, p < .001). Finally, self-stigma significantly 
mediated the relationship between psychological distress and group identification (B = -.232, SE 
= .471, p = .624), as was indicated by the exclusion of zero in the 95% confidence interval of the 
indirect effect (β = -.150, SE = .0583, 95% CI: -.286 to -.0571). These results provide some 
(albeit limited) support for the stigma salience idea: greater symptoms might make self-stigma 
more salient, which could then lead to less group identification. That said, it should be noted that 
this mediation model was conducted with correlational data and as such these findings should be 
considered with extreme caution. 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Mediation Model 
Note. The relationship between psychological distress and group identification with people who 
use mental health services as mediated by self-stigma of seeking help.  
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSION/DISCUSSION 
The object of this study was to gather data about psychologists’ own mental illness and 
mental health stigma and relate it to Allport’s contact hypothesis (1954) and Pettigrew’s (1998, 
2011) intergroup contact theory. The data about psychologists’ own mental illness included 
diagnosis, mental health treatment history, and a measure of current symptoms. This was to help 
clarify the participants’ personal experience of mental illness to help tease out how their current 
symptoms and history of mental illness might be related to their stigma. Furthermore, this study 
provided updated figures of experiences with mental illness in psychologists in the United States, 
a population that has not been assessed for this since 2002. The data about psychologists’ own 
mental health related stigma included personal stigma of mental illness, self-stigma of seeking 
help, and self-stigma of mental illness.  
 The contact hypothesis and intergroup contact theory were assessed through 
psychologists’ group identification with other psychologists, people with mental illness, and 
people who use mental health services as well as number of hours of contact (i.e., the number of 
hours per week the psychologist meets with clients); their familiarity with mental illness in any 
setting; as well as the psychologists’ own psychological distress. The respective influence of 
these variables was then tested using hierarchical regressions.  
Psychologists’ own Mental Illness  
 It is useful to compare the data regarding psychologists’ own mental illness and mental 
health treatment from this study to similar studies conducted in the past. Differences in data 
collection practices make direct comparison difficult, but nevertheless intriguing. The two past 
studies conducted in the United States focused on depression specifically while the one study 
conducted in the United Kingdom focused on mental illness in general. Pope and Tabachnick 
(1994) did not report a breakdown of specific diagnoses but reported that 61% of their sample of 
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476 psychologists (both clinical and counseling) had experienced at least one episode of what the 
participants self-reported as clinical depression. Gilroy, Carroll, and Murra (2002) more 
specifically asked if the counseling psychologists in their study had experienced depressive 
symptoms while working as clinicians; the authors then obtained specific diagnoses. Despite the 
difference in methodology, Gilroy and colleagues (2002) obtained a number remarkably close to 
Pope and Tabachnick (1994) – 62% of their 425 participants. The authors did not make clear 
which of the listed diagnoses were included in this statistic, but it appears that adjustment 
disorders with depressed mood, bipolar disorder, and dysthymia were included along with major 
depressive disorders. If the present study were to define depressive symptoms similarly, 58 of the 
143 participants or 41% would qualify. This is a lower number than either of the previous 
studies.  
 That said, in the present study when we asked participants if they had ever experienced a 
mental illness, 72.7% answered yes. In the United Kingdom study of clinical psychologists, Tay, 
Alcock, and Scior (2018) found that 62.7% of their 678 participants reported having mental 
health problems at some point in their lives. The percentage of participants reporting depressive 
symptoms were split into two groups, mild to moderate depression (44% of all participants) and 
severe depression (8% of all participants). Of note, the way Tay and colleagues reported their 
data, there could be overlap in the two groups. In this way, Tay and colleagues’ findings are 
more similar to those in the present study rather than those in past studies.  
 Roughly comparing the above findings to established lifetime prevalence estimates of 
various disorders is eye opening. According to the National Comorbidity Survey Replication 
(NCS-R), observed lifetime prevalence of any disorder in the United States is 46.4% and for any 
mood disorder is 20.8% (Kessler et al., 2005). While it must be said that direct comparison is not 
68 
 
possible due to marked differences in methodology – the findings from these studies are not 
prevalence estimates – nevertheless, the three studies with psychologists are consistent in finding 
that participants’ self-report of lifetime mental illness are higher than general prevalence 
estimates by 15-25%. This means that it is likely that psychologists, overall, have experienced 
mental illness and in particular depression at rates higher than the general population.  
 Interestingly, the present study appears to be the first that included any measure of 
current psychological distress. This is notable; even though 72.7% of participants in our study 
answered that they had ever experienced a mental illness, participants’ mean score on the GP-
CORE (the measure of psychological distress used) was comparable to a nonclinical sample for 
both men and women. Even the top 75th percentile for the GP-CORE mean for both men and 
women was below the cutoff for a clinical sample. These findings appear to be contradictory. 
While participants’ lifetime prevalence of any disorder is notably higher than epidemiological 
estimates, on average their current symptoms are nonclinical in nature. One explanation for this 
finding could be that psychologists may have higher rates of their own mental illness, but they 
also have higher rates of having sought mental health treatment – and the mental health treatment 
succeeded in returning psychologists to a healthy state. In order to explore this possibility, we 
look to our data on participants’ own mental health treatment.  
Psychologists’ own Mental Health Treatment 
 In the present study, 76.2% of participants, or 109 of 143, reported they had received 
treatment for mental illness in their lifetime with 74.8% or 107 reporting they had attended 
psychotherapy and 53.1% reporting they been on any psychoactive medications. Pope and 
Tabachnick (1994) found 84% of their 476 participants reported having been a client in therapy; 
they did not report if participants had been in other kinds of mental health treatment. Gilroy and 
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colleagues (2002) were much more targeted in their study; they asked participants to indicate if 
they had experienced depressive symptoms while working as clinicians and whether they had 
sought treatment for those symptoms in particular. Under these circumstances, 42% reported 
they had sought treatment with 14% indicating they had been prescribed psychotropic 
medication and 0.5% reporting they had been hospitalized. It is possible that, had Gilroy and 
colleagues asked about mental illness and treatment in a way that was more general, as was done 
in Pope and Tabachnick’s study and the present one, that the findings would be more similar. As 
it stands, however, it is difficult to compare.  
In the study by Tay and colleagues (2018), they only asked participants who had 
experienced mental health problems if they sought help. Of the 425 who reported mental health 
problems, 84% or 357 participants sought help. This represents 53% of their total sample. While 
Tay and colleagues did not report the number of participants who sought treatment from any 
psychotherapist, of the 425 who reported mental health problems 46% had seen a private 
psychotherapist, 13% had seen a private clinical psychologist, 12% had seen a clinical 
psychologist through the National Health Service (NHS) - the United Kingdom’s free, state-
sponsored health care system, and 11% had seen an NHS psychotherapist. It is also not clear how 
many participants had ever been on psychoactive medication, although of the 425 participants 
with mental health problems, 53% reported they had gone to a general practitioner, 10% to an 
NHS psychiatrist, and 4% to private psychiatrist. As a note, percentages total more than 100% 
because participants could choose more than one type of health professional. Similar to the 
difficulty in comparing Gilroy and colleagues’ study to the present one, it is also difficult to 
compare Tay and colleagues’ due to differences in methodology.  
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 Overall, the differences in the way each study asked about mental illness and mental 
health treatment make it difficult to ascertain if the differences found are reflective of population 
differences or just divergence in methodology. Future studies would do well to either replicate 
the methods used in previous studies or find a way to standardize their methods. 
Hypothesis 1: Group Identification and Psychologists’ own Psychological distress 
My hypothesis that the relationship between psychological distress and group 
identification with people with mental illness (GIMI) and people who use mental health services 
(GIU) would be more likely exponential than linear was not supported. Neither the linear nor 
exponential regressions for GIMI were significant. In contrast, both the linear and exponential 
regressions for GIU were significant, with the linear regression accounting for about the same 
amount of variance (3.8%) as the exponential regression (3.0%), contrary to my hypothesis. Both 
the linear and exponential models were consistent with the data and had small effects. Also, in 
both cases more severe psychological distress significantly predicted lower group identification 
with people who use mental health services; these negative relationships were the opposite of 
what I expected.  
On the other hand, the correlation between GIMI and GIU was significant, as predicted. 
Psychologists who identified with others who have mental illness appeared to also identify with 
others who use mental health services. The correlation was not as strong as I expected, however. 
It was weak to moderate which indicates that, while the two concepts are related, they are 
nevertheless distinct. 
  It was surprising that GIU was significantly related to psychological distress but GIMI 
was not. As a measure of the symptoms that make up a mental illness, I would have predicted 
that psychological distress would be more directly related to identifying with other people with 
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mental illness rather than other people who use mental health services. Considering the 
significant (though weak to moderate) correlation between GIMI and GIU, I would have 
expected psychological distress to predict both types of group identification. It is possible that 
with more participants, either the exponential or linear regressions for GIMI would have been 
significant, but even still the standardized coefficients for GIMI and the amount of variance 
explained by GIMI were smaller than for GIU.  
 In any case, the regressions for GIU indicated that the more serious the psychological 
distress the lower the GIU for participants. It may be that psychological distress are in some way 
inhibiting participants’ ability to relate to others who use mental health service. Or conversely, as 
people identify more with those who use services their psychological distress decrease. This 
could be explained by a third variable: actually receiving mental health services. Perhaps those 
who receive services may be more likely to identify with others who use services. In addition, 
those who receive services are more likely to have fewer symptoms.  
Follow-Up Analysis: Psychological distress, Group Identification, and Self-Stigma of 
Seeking Help 
With these surprising results, we looked for a third variable that might impact the 
relationship between psychological distress and group identification with people who use mental 
health services (GIU). I tested a model whereby SSOSH mediated the relationship between 
psychological distress and GIU. Results indicated that SSOSH fully mediated the relationship 
between psychological distress and GIU whereby higher psychological distress was related to 
higher self-stigma which was related to less group identification.  
The fact that higher psychological distress predict higher SSOSH could be explained by 
the notion of salience. Bitman-Heinrichs (2017) suggested salience might explain an unexpected 
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finding in her study: that higher public stigma of seeking help predicted actual help seeking 
behavior in a sample of 125 clinically distressed adults. This finding was different than other 
studies in the literature that found that higher public stigma was associated with lower intentions 
to seek help (e.g. Vogel, Wade, & Hackler, 2007) with samples that were not clinically 
distressed. Bitman-Heinrichs (2017) suggested that in clinically distressed populations issues of 
stigma are more salient and more imminent; people with clinical distress are likely to be more 
aware of and perhaps more concerned about public stigma.  
Even though the finding in the present study is regarding self-stigma, a similar process 
could be at play. If psychological distress is higher, then self-stigma of seeking help (SSOSH) 
could be more salient to the person. If SSOSH were higher, then a person would have endorsed 
more strongly items such as, “I would feel worse about myself if I could not solve my own 
problems.” If my psychological distress were at a point where I could solve my own problems, 
then it wouldn’t bother me as much to think about going to get help. I am not faced with the 
decision of whether or not I would need professional help. The question is hypothetical. But as 
soon as I am in clinical distress and I am faced with a situation where I cannot solve my 
problems on my own, it’s not hypothetical anymore. Because it’s not hypothetical, the shame of 
needing to get help (the self-stigma of seeking help) is activated in a way that wasn’t possible 
before.  
This process could be underscored by the fact that this is a sample of health service 
psychologists. There is an expectation that, as a psychologist, they will need to seek help from a 
therapist at some point. Seeking therapy in graduate school is strongly encouraged in many 
programs. When seeking therapy is a hypothetical, it is not difficult to endorse self-stigma items 
in a way that is consistent with this value, producing lower total scores on the SSOSH. However, 
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if a psychologist is in clinical distress then seeking help is no longer hypothetical. Suddenly, the 
shame of seeking help is real whether or not it is consistent with my professional values; hence 
greater endorsement of SSOSH.  
The next step in the mediation, that higher SSOSH is related to lower group identification 
with people who use mental health services (GIU), feels logical upon closer consideration of the 
types of items in each scale. Higher SSOSH scores indicate higher endorsement of items like “It 
would make me feel inferior to ask a therapist for help.” Lower GIU scores indicate lower 
endorsement of items like, “I am pleased to be a person who uses mental health services.” If a 
person feels inferior to ask a therapist for help would he or she be pleased to be a person who 
uses mental health services? Probably not. The data provide some evidence for this notion.  
It is important to note two major limitations of this finding: this analysis was done post 
hoc and with cross-sectional data. Certainly, no interpretations about the direction of the effect or 
causality can be made at this time. The results from this mediation model are tentative and need 
considerable follow-up before any definitive statements can be made. 
Hypothesis 2: Group Identification and Psychologists’ own Psychotherapy 
  My hypothesis that the more therapy sessions participants had attended in the last five 
years or since obtaining their license, the greater the degree to which they would identify with 
people who use mental health services was supported; the correlation between number of 
sessions and GIU was positive and significant. That said, the correlation was weak (r = .25). This 
is interesting, considering one might assume the number of therapy sessions would have a strong 
relationship with whether participants identified with others who use mental health services, but 
this was not the case. It would be interesting to explore what other factors may contribute to 
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GIU, such as self-stigma of mental illness as described above. It is possible that other types of 
mental health related stigma could also play a part.  
 Additionally, the hierarchical regression analysis suggested that number of therapy 
sessions and not simply whether participants had ever used mental health services was what 
predicted group identification with people who use mental health services. This is curious, as one 
might assume that whether participants had ever used mental health services – an umbrella 
variable that included whether participants had been to therapy – might be a more powerful 
predictor of group identification with people who use mental health services than number of 
therapy sessions. That said, number of therapy sessions is a variable with more depth than 
whether they had ever used mental health services, a categorical variable. Even if participants 
endorsed that they had used mental health services it does not indicate how often or how recently 
they had used mental health services. People who visited their primary care provider once 25 
years ago are potentially lumped in with people who have attended psychotherapy weekly for 
most of their adult lives. In the former situation the participant is unlikely to identify with others 
who have used mental health services, while in the latter they are more likely.  
Hypothesis 3: Group Identification with Psychologists and People Who Use Mental Health 
Services 
 Contrary to my hypothesis, the degree to which participants identified with being a 
licensed psychologist did not significantly correlate with the degree to which they identified with 
people who use mental health services. Neither did the degree to which participants identified 
with people with mental illness correlate with the degree to which participants identify with 
being a licensed psychologist. That said, as participants’ psychological distress grew more severe 
their group identification with other psychologists decreased significantly. There is an important 
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distinction here; it is not group identification with service users or people with mental illness that 
relates to decreased group identification with being a psychologist, but rather the presence of 
psychological distress in and of itself. This suggests that the mechanism at play here may not be 
a matter of feeling conflicted about group identification, but rather there seems to be a more 
direct relationship between psychological distress and group identification with being a licensed 
psychologist. 
 Self-categorization theory (Turner & Reynolds, 2012; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987; Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995), which is related to social identity theory (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1986), posits that people’s social identities are defined by categorizing the self and 
others into distinct ingroups and outgroups according to prototypes. A prototype is a subjective 
representation of the key characteristics of a social category and is context specific; it can change 
over time or be based on immediate social situation. Because ingroups and outgroups are defined 
as distinct entities, prototypes and their related ingroups are strongly influenced by important 
outgroups (Hogg et al., 1995). In the case of psychologists, an important outgroup is their clients 
– people with mental illness and people who use mental health services. Prototypically, it may be 
that a major difference between a psychologist and their client is that a psychologist is supposed 
to have a healthy level of psychological distress in order to take care of clients. If a psychologist 
does not have a healthy level of psychological distress, they struggle to relate to the prototype of 
a psychologist. Future research could explore this possibility by assessing what specific 
characteristics make up the prototype of a psychologist.  
Hypothesis 4: Contact and Various Types of Stigma 
 My hypothesis regarding the way various types of contact would impact three aspects of 
mental health related stigma, had little support overall. Three stepwise hierarchical regressions 
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were meant to test how increasing levels of contact would impact mental health related stigma in 
psychologists; each type of mental health related stigma was assessed with its own five step 
hierarchical regression. The three types of mental health related stigma were: personal stigma of 
mental illness, self-stigma of help-seeking, and self-stigma of mental illness. The five steps of 
each hierarchical regression were: 1) hours per week spent providing mental health services, 
which stands as a measure of simple contact, 2) degree of contact, a measure designed to assess 
for different types of contact with people with mental illness, 3) reported history of own mental 
illness and number of therapy sessions in the last five years or since receiving license, 4) group 
identification with people with mental illness, and 5) group identification with people who use 
mental health services.   
 Personal stigma of mental illness. Of all the variables tested, only group identification 
with people with mental illness (GIMI) significantly predicted personal stigma of mental illness. 
As GIMI increased personal stigma of mental illness decreased. This finding is notable because 
personal stigma of mental illness, as a measure of the participants’ own attitudes toward those 
with mental illness, is likely the cleanest estimate of stigma or prejudice against another group in 
this study. Allport’s contact hypothesis (1954) would have predicted the contact variable (hours 
per week spent providing services to people with mental illness) would predict less prejudice. If 
we remember, however, Allport’s contact hypothesis has four conditions for intergroup contact 
to lower prejudice: the groups must have equal status within the contact situation; the groups 
must be working toward common goals; the groups must be cooperating with one another and 
not competing; and the groups must have support from authorities, law, or custom. Doubtless, at 
least one condition is not met for contact between psychologists and their clients: there is not 
equal status in the contact situation. That said, Pettigrew (1998) noted that research over the last 
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fifty years suggests contact should lower prejudice even absent one or more of the four 
conditions. And yet that is not reflected in these results.  
 This is where intergroup contact theory may help explain the results. Pettigrew’s (1998) 
intergroup contact theory improves upon Allport’s  (1954) contact hypothesis by positing four 
processes by which contact decreases prejudice or stigma: learning about the outgroup, changing 
behavior (because behavior change often precedes attitude change), generating emotional ties in 
the intergroup relationship like one sees in friendship, and providing insight about the ingroup as 
well as the outgroup. The essence of these processes is that a friendship-like relationship needs to 
develop in order for contact to have positive effects (Pettigrew, 1998; 2011). Here again, we 
might expect some of the other variables in the series of regressions to predict lower stigma. For 
example, the degree of contact was meant to measure how personal participants’ relationships 
with people with mental illness were. On the degree of contact measure, watching a documentary 
about a person with a mental illness has a lower score than living with a person with a mental 
illness. However, a pitfall of this particular measure is that it asks about the existence of certain 
experiences or relationships, but not their quality. If I live with a person with mental illness with 
whom I have a poor relationship, this is not likely to decrease my personal stigma. On the other 
hand, it also makes sense that identifying myself as a person with mental illness would lower 
personal stigma – as we found in this study. The items on the identification scale include being 
pleased one has a mental illness and feeling strong ties with others who have mental illness. 
Scoring high on the group identification with people with mental illness measure indicates the 
participant may have generated those emotional ties with others with mental illness.  
 Self-stigma of seeking help. The strongest predictor of self-stigma of seeking help 
(SSOSH) in terms of variance explained was not any of the predicted variables, but current 
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psychological distress, which explained 21.2% of the variance. The significant positive 
relationship between SSOSH and current psychological distress has been noted elsewhere in the 
literature including in a military sample (Heath, Seidman, Vogel, Cornish, & Wade, 2017), 
considering self-stigma and current depression symptoms (Kendra, Mohr, & Pollard, 2014), and 
self-stigma and psychological well-being (Owen, Thomas, & Rodolfa, 2013). It appears that the 
relationship between self-stigma and current psychological symptoms is an area that deserves 
more specific attention, especially considering the relationship found in the above described 
mediation analysis. I recommend that future studies explore this relationship in more detail.  
 Another interesting finding was that, after controlling for group identification with people 
who use mental health services, the more participants identified with other people with mental 
illness the higher their self-stigma of seeking help. This finding accounted for 14.2% of the 
variance in self-stigma of seeking help. Considering the previously found relationship with self-
stigma of seeking help and reduced likelihood of seeking psychological help in other 
populations, especially college students (Vogel, Wade, & Hackler, 2007; Vogel et al., 2017), it 
would be instructive to see if a similar relationship is present with psychologists. In the event 
that it is, testing previously attempted interventions to buffer against self-stigma of seeking help 
with the new population of psychologists could produce fruit. For example, creating a public 
health campaign with electronic brochures could lower this self-stigma. Continuing education 
about the prevalence of mental illness among psychologists and steps to help those that are 
experiencing symptoms could possibly both alleviate stigma and help prevent a situation where a 
psychologists’ mental health deteriorates to the point where they are impaired.  
 Self-stigma of mental illness. Only the degree of contact that participants had with those 
with mental illness and identification with those who have a mental illness predicted self-stigma 
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of mental illness. In contrast to the relationship found with self-stigma of seeking help, I found 
that as participants reported greater identification with those who have a mental illness, they had 
lower self-stigma of mental illness. Based on this relationship alone it would be tempting to say 
that greater identification with those with mental illness is related to lower self-stigma. Based on 
previous findings, however, there appears to be a more complex relationship going on. Future 
research would do well to clarify this relationship.  
 Measurement concerns. It should be noted that neither hours per week spent providing 
mental health services nor self-report of history of mental illness were significant predictors in 
any of the three hierarchical regressions. This could be due to any of several factors. It could 
simply be that there was no relationship to find between them and the stigma variables, but it 
could also be due to the low sample size or due to problems in measurement. The power analysis 
indicated that we would need usable data from almost 400 participants to detect a small effect 
with seven predictor variables and we only had 143. I suspect this might be what happened, for 
example, in Step 3 of the personal stigma of mental illness regression where own mental illness 
came up as a significant predictor, but the overall step was not significant.  
That said, the scores could also have been poor representations of the concept of interest. 
Hours per week spent providing mental health services may not have been a good indicator of 
how much contact participants had had with people with mental illness and people who use 
mental health services, especially for clinicians who had been working as licensed psychologists 
for decades. For example, several participants who had been licensed since the 1970’s or 1980’s 
saw clients for 25 hours per week or less. It is possible that earlier in their career they may have 
seen more clients per week, but now they see fewer because they are in semi-retirement or have 
moved into administrative or teaching positions that involve less face-to-face client work. And 
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then it could be argued that cumulative hours spent with people with mental illness or people 
who use mental health services would be a better indicator of simple contact than hours per week 
spent with clients recently (See Appendix B).  
Group Identification and Mental Health Related Stigma  
 Interestingly, as group identification with people who use mental health services 
increased self-stigma of seeking help and self-stigma of mental illness decreased. Similarly, as 
group identification with people with mental illness increased self-stigma of mental illness 
decreased. Considering people with greater self-stigma are more likely to report diminished self-
esteem (Corrigan, Watson, & Barr, 2006; Corrigan, Rafacz, & Rüsch, 2011), these findings are 
consistent with research that found disability pride protects self-esteem (Bogart, Lund, & 
Rottenstein, 2018) according to the rejection-identification model (RIM; Branscombe, Schmitt, 
& Harvey, 1999). The RIM stated that African-Americans’ willingness to make attributions of 
prejudice across a variety of life situations was directly and negatively related to personal well-
being (defined as higher personal self-esteem and lower experience of negative emotions), but 
that their attributions would be mediated by minority group identification, which would have a 
positive effect on well-being (Branscombe et al., 1999). Further development on the RIM 
suggested that the experience of stigma or discrimination is associated with reduced self-esteem 
but positive ingroup identification serves as a mediating variable that supports self-esteem and 
has been verified in a variety of stigmatized groups including ethnic minorities, international 
students, and even people with dwarfism (Bogart et al., 2018). Future research should explore the 
relationship between disability identity (specifically psychiatric disability identity) and stigma. 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
 There are limitations to the present study that need to be noted. First, it is important to 
note that the results presented are correlational and do not show causation. This is underscored 
by the cross-sectional nature of this data, which did not allow for us to establish temporality in 
the findings. In the future, longitudinal research would aid in establishing if, for example, 
psychological distress proceeds self-stigma of seeking help which proceeds group identification 
with people who use mental health services. Experimental designs would be ideal in future 
research, as this would allow for more direct testing of causal elements. Additionally, this study 
is limited by its small sample size. This is not to say that collecting data from licensed 
psychologists is an easy task – quite the contrary. However, it is possible that with a sample size 
of 143 we did not have the requisite power to find significance in some of these analyses. 
 Then, the method of data collection, namely soliciting responses from licensed 
psychologists by way of American Psychological Association (APA) and state association 
ListServs was not ideal. For one, it had been my intention to follow the data collection methods 
of previous studies (Pope & Tabachnick, 1994; Gilroy et al., 2002) by referring to the APA 
Membership Directory, randomly selecting members, and sending private invitations to complete 
the study. This would have allowed me to calculate response rates and have a better idea of what 
sort of psychologists were choosing to respond (gender, location, etc.) compared to those who 
were not. It would have likely been a more varied sample in some regards, as the APA Directory 
is national. However, using the APA Directory for research purposes is now against its 
acceptable use policy. After exploring other avenues for collecting data, it was determined that 
sending requests for participants using ListServs was the only feasible option.  
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This method of data collection, unfortunately, introduces self-selection bias. For example, 
it is possible that psychologists who have a history of mental illness were more likely to respond 
than those without such a history. Without knowing exactly to whom the invitation was sent it is 
not possible to estimate the degree to which self-selection bias may have been problematic. It is 
therefore recommended that future researchers attempt to collect data in a more comprehensive 
manner, such as by getting a nationally representative sample of psychologists. In addition, there 
were notable differences between my sample’s demographics and those reported by the 2015 
American Psychological Association (APA) survey of health service psychologists. In terms of 
percentages, compared to the 2015 APA sample, the present study had more women, fewer 
European American/White, fewer Latin American/Hispanic, more Asian/Asian American, fewer 
African American, more multiracial American, and more people with at least one disability. It is 
not known how these differences in demographics might have impacted the study, but future 
studies would do well to attempt to approximate the demographics of the U.S. population of 
health service psychologists.  
 Next, this study was limited by lack of previously validated measures of several of the 
variables of interest. For instance, after searching in vain for a measure of egalitarianism between 
therapist and client I was not able to find one. The attempt to create one for the purpose of this 
study was not successful; the psychometric properties were not adequate for use in analyses. As a 
result, I could not fully test Hypothesis 4: how types of contact impacted stigma. Relatedly, in 
the literature there is little standardization of measures or methodology used between 
researchers, making comparison between studies difficult. For example, in their studies of 
psychologists, Pope and Tabachnick (1994) and Gilroy, Carroll, and Murra (2002) collected data 
on participants’ history of depression rather than on mental illness in general. In contrast, Tay, 
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Alcock, and Scior (2018) collected data on mental illness in general. This makes it more difficult 
to compare findings. Additionally, Tay and colleagues – the only one of the three studies to 
measure participants’ stigma – used different measures of stigma than I did, again making it 
difficult to compare findings. I suggest in the future attempting to standardize which measures 
are used, specifically with regard to stigma and psychological distress, so that comparisons 
between studies would be possible.  
 Another limitation of this study is that, for Hypothesis 4 testing how various types of 
contact impact stigma, the same six independent variables were used to predict personal stigma 
of mental illness, self-stigma of seeking help, and self-stigma of mental illness. Considering the 
conceptual differences between these three types of stigma, it would have been better to make 
separate predictions for each type of stigma that were specific to each. In addition, it would be 
interesting to assess how the level of severity of clients seen by participants impacted their 
stigma, as contact with more severe clients could possibly lower stigma.  
 A limitation worth noting is that the measures used in this study were all face-valid 
measures – direct measures of stigma – which has its drawbacks. Micheals & Corrigan (2013) 
recommended testing for mental illness stigma in a way that reduces participants’ ability to 
answer in a socially desirable way. Micheals & Corrigan (2013) created a measure of mental 
illness stigma that would have reduced effects of social desirability, called the Knowledge Test 
of Mental Illness (KTMI). Basically, this measure proports to be a multiple-choice test of the 
participants’ knowledge about mental illness and the treatments associated with it. The truth, 
however, is that neither of the two options presented are accurate; rather the accurate choice is 
somewhere in between the two answers. For example, one question is, “The divorce rate among 
the general population is about 50%. What is the divorce rate among people who experience 
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mental illness?” The answer choices are “a) Greater than 70%,” and “b) Less than 50%.” The 
true answer is that the divorce rate among people with mental illness is the same as the general 
population – about 50%. This, however, is not an option. The selection of one answer over the 
other, therefore, indicates whether a person is higher or lower in stigma against people with 
mental illness. Because the measure pretends to be a quiz of knowledge it can measure stigma 
without asking about it directly.  
 Unfortunately, after much deliberation it was decided that the KTMI would not be an 
appropriate measure for professional psychologists. For one, professional psychologists may 
know the most accurate answer and realize that the KTMI didn’t offer that answer. This could 
allow them to realize that the KTMI wasn’t actually assessing knowledge, but something else – 
attitudes. Therefore, the KTMI wouldn’t function as a measure of stigma with reduced effects of 
social desirability, defeating the point of using it. Secondly, eight of the fourteen items refer to 
schizophrenia instead of general mental illness or even severe mental illness. Thus, a more 
appropriate name might have been the “Knowledge Test of Schizophrenia” rather than the 
“Knowledge Test of Mental Illness.” The focus of the present study was not schizophrenia but 
rather more general mental illness, which made the KTMI an inappropriate choice in this way as 
well.  
Finally, it would be instructive to study the interplay between reported mental illness and 
psychological symptoms. Of the four studies collecting data on psychologists’ own mental 
illness in the last 26 years (Pope and Tabachnick, 1994; Gilroy et al., 2002; Tay et al., 2018), this 
is the only study to ask about both history of mental illness and to measure current psychological 
distress. Based on preliminary analyses, it appears that current psychological distress is a 
stronger predictor of the self-stigma of seeking help and mental illness than reported history of 
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mental illness. While history of mental illness did not significantly predict any of the three types 
of mental health stigma, psychological distress significantly predicted both types of self-stigma 
significantly. Psychological distress accounted for over 20% of the variance in self-stigma of 
seeking help – the most variance accounted for by any single predictor in this study. Which begs 
the question, what part does history of mental illness play in this 26-year-old story? Did the 
authors of all four studies – the present study and the three above cited studies – just follow a red 
herring by collecting information on psychologists’ history of mental illness? Or is there some 
sort of relationship between history of mental illness and stigma that this study is overlooking?  
Conclusion 
 This was the first study in 18 years to assess licensed psychologists in the United States 
for their own mental health and treatment history along and the only known study linking U.S. 
psychologists’ own mental health to stigmatizing attitudes toward people with mental illness, 
including themselves. I had hypothesized that, based on Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis and 
Pettigrew’s (1998, 2011) intergroup contact theory, increased levels of contact with people with 
mental illness would result in lower levels of stigma – especially personal contact. This 
hypothesis was not supported, at least as reflected in the way contact was measured in this study. 
Instead a complex relationship between psychologists’ own mental illness, current psychological 
distress, and mental health stigma emerged.  
 According to the results of this study, Psychologists may have higher lifetime rates of 
mental illness than the general population, in particular depression. In contrast, the 
psychologists’ current psychological distress was more similar to a nonclinical sample than a 
clinical one. At the same time, the levels of psychologists seeking mental health treatment was 
high in this study (76.2%). It was lower than one study’s estimate of psychologists (Pope & 
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Tabachnick, 1994) but higher than others (Gilroy et al., 2002; Tay et al., 2018), although major 
differences in methodology make comparison difficult.  
 With regard to mental health stigma, the strongest relationship I found was between 
psychologists’ psychological distress and their levels of self-stigma of seeking help. I ran a 
mediation model testing the mediating role of self-stigma of seeking help between current 
psychological distress and group identification with people who use mental health services; it 
was significant. This provided (limited) evidence of the notion that self-stigma of seeking help is 
activated by psychological distress. In other words, as psychological distress increased it made 
self-stigma of mental illness more salient, resulting in higher endorsement of the stigma. This in 
turn, made it less likely participants would endorse group identification with people who use 
mental health services.  
Additionally, psychological distress predicted lower group identification with 
psychologists. This may provide evidence that clinical levels of psychological distress are 
contrary to the prototype, or the collective mental image, of what makes a psychologist 
according to self-categorization theory (Turner & Reynolds, 2012). According to a discourse 
going back to Carl Jung, Zeruvabel and Wright (2012) suggested that there is a common notion 
among therapists that there is a split between clients/patients as the wounded ones and 
psychotherapists as the healers. Applying this notion to the concept of the prototype of a licensed 
psychologist, it seems likely that a psychologist is expected to be the picture of good mental 
health in order to do their best work. This would indicate that the prototype of a psychologist 
doesn’t include a history of mental illness, and certainly not current symptoms of mental illness. 
This would make sense of the repeated finding that many psychotherapists stigmatize colleagues 
who have a history of mental illness or are currently experiencing it (Knaak, Mantler, & Szeto, 
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2017; Zerubavel & Wright, 2012; Cain, 2000); perhaps psychotherapists are upholding the 
prototype of a licensed psychologists and are chastising those who do not fit it. 
 We see this stigmatization despite the fact that studies like this dissertation have 
repeatedly found that licensed psychologists have a higher than average history of experiencing 
mental illness (Pope & Tabachnick, 1994; Gilroy et al., 2002; Tay et al., 2018). This is 
problematic not only because it means the prototype is unrealistic but because it discourages 
psychologists from seeking professional help and social support from colleagues. Instead, it 
encourages psychologists to hide the mental illness. This is considering that a history of mental 
illness is a risk factor for developing a mental illness in the future (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013), psychologists may be at increased risk for developing a mental illness at 
some point in their career or for experiencing a chronic mental illness. If they are less willing to 
get the help they need because of stigma, this makes psychologists more vulnerable to issues like 
countertransference, compassion fatigue, and in some cases professional impairment (Zerubavel 
& Wright, 2012).  
We need not be ashamed of a history of mental illness or other personal struggles. Calling 
on the paradigm of the wounded healer – a paradigm that dates as far back as ancient Greece – 
Zerubavel and Wright (2012) note that psychotherapists can draw upon their woundedness to 
help heal both themselves and their clients. Also, many psychotherapists choose their profession 
specifically because they have been through their own journey of pain and suffering (Farber, 
Manevich, Metzger, & Saypol, 2005). Zerubavel and Wright (2012) stated that all therapists 
have some degree of woundedness in that we all have had painful experiences, have experienced 
physical or emotional suffering, or have overcome adversity. The findings from this study along 
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with studies in the past underscore this notion – the majority of licensed psychologists report 
having experienced some kind of mental illness in their past.  
Instead of shaming psychologists into fear and silence for experiencing symptoms of 
mental illness, I believe we as a profession need to learn to support one another and embrace this 
all too common experience as an opportunity for growth both personally and professionally. It is 
time that we pull back the curtain and be vulnerable about our own experiences with mental 
illness as well as other areas where we have both been wounded and healed. It is time we support 
one another, helping each other get the interventions we need when actively struggling with a 
mental illness. It is time we see the woundedness and suffering in our own lives as a source of 
healing and resilience. Afterall, isn’t that what we encourage our clients to do?  
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APPENDIX A: STUDY MATERIALS 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 Title of Study: Licensed Psychologists and Mental Illness  
  
Investigators: Nathaniel Wade (Faculty Supervisor), Lily Mathison (Student Principle 
Investigator)  
  
Invitation to be Part of a Research Study 
You are invited to participate in a research study. This form has information to help you 
decide whether or not you wish to participate—please review it carefully. Research studies 
include only people who choose to take part—your participation is completely voluntary 
and you can stop at any time.  
  
Please email or call the project staff any questions you have about the study or about this 
form before deciding to participate.   
  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to better understand health service psychologists’ personal 
experiences with mental illness and their professional and personal attitudes toward 
mental illness.  
  
Eligibility to Participate 
You are eligible to participate in this study if you are 18 years of age or older, area licensed 
psychologist, are fluent in English, reside in the United States of America, and you provide 
mental health services (psychotherapy, psychological testing, or medication management, 
if applicable) to clients/patients two or more hours per week. 
  
You should not participate if you are under 18 years of age, are not fluent in English, do not 
reside in the United States, or do not provide mental health services to clients/patients for 
two hours per week or more.  
  
On the next screen, you will be asked if you meet these requirements. If not, you will be 
screened out of the study.  
  
Description of Study Procedures  
If you agree to participate, you will be asked to complete an online survey in which you will 
provide information about your own personal experiences with mental health and your 
personal history of mental health treatment (if any). We will also ask about your attitudes 
toward those with mental illness. You will also be asked to provide demographic 
information about yourself.  
  
At the end of the survey, there will be a link to take you to a separate Qualtrics survey to 
enter your email address to be included in the drawing for one of four (4) $50 Amazon gift 
cards.  
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Expected Duration of Participation 
Your participation will last for about 10-15 minutes.   
 
Risks or Discomforts 
Some participants may become uncomfortable discussing mental illness or disclosing their 
personal or professional experience with mental illness. However, you may leave blank any 
questions you feel uncomfortable answering and/or may stop at any point without penalty.  
  
If you are experiencing personal distress, or experiencing distress after completing these 
research materials, we encourage you to seek assistance from local mental health 
providers or to call the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) HelpLine at 1-800-950-
NAMI (6264).  
  
Benefits to you and to Others 
It is hoped that the information gained in this study will benefit society by increasing 
understanding about psychologists’ attitudes towards mental illness and about their own 
personal and professional experiences with mental illness.  
  
If you decide to participate in this study there are no direct benefits to you.  
  
If you would like, after all data have been collected and analyzed we can send a summary 
of findings to you by email. (At the end of the survey there will be an option to give your 
email address for this purpose.) 
  
Costs and Compensation  
Other than you time, there will be not costs associated with participating in this survey.  
  
You will have the option to enter to win one of four (4) $50 Amazon gift cards by clicking 
the link at the end of the survey, imputing your email address, selecting the option to enter. 
You will also have the option to receive a summary of the study’s findings after all data 
have been collected and analyzed. As your participation is completely voluntary, you are 
not required to answer any survey questions in order to enter the drawing or receive a 
summary of the findings.  
  
We will not use your email address for any other purpose than to notify you of winning the 
drawing and/or to email you a summary of the results.  
  
Should you win the drawing for an Amazon gift card, you will need to complete a form to 
receive payment. Please know that payments may be subject to tax withholding 
requirements, which vary depending upon whether you are a legal resident of the U.S. or 
another country. If required, taxes will be withheld from the payment you receive. 
  
This information allows the University to fulfill government reporting requirements. 
Confidentiality measures are in place to keep this information secure. Information 
regarding documentation required for participant compensation may be obtained from the 
Controller’s Department: (515)294-2555 or http://www.controller.iastate.edu. 
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Your Rights as a Research Participant 
Participating in this study is completely voluntary. You may choose not to take part in the 
study or to stop participating at any time, for any reason, without penalty or negative 
consequences. You can skip any questions that you do not wish to answer. 
  
If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or research-related injury, 
please contact the IRB Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or Director, (515) 
294-3115, Office for Responsible Research, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011.  
  
Confidentiality 
Research records identifying participants will be kept confidential to the extent permitted 
by applicable laws and regulations and will not be made publicly available without your 
permission. However, it is possible that other people and offices responsible for making 
sure research is done safely and responsibly will see your information. This includes 
federal government regulatory agencies, auditing departments of Iowa State University, 
and the Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves human subject 
research studies) may inspect and/or copy study records for quality assurance and data 
analysis. These records may contain private information. 
  
Your identity will not be associated with your responses on the questionnaire in any way. 
Your participation will be completely anonymous. Your email address, should you choose 
to enter it for the drawing and/or to receive the summary of research results, will be kept 
separate from your answers to the questionnaires so it cannot be linked to them. 
  
To protect confidentiality of the study records and data the following measures will be 
taken:  
•     Data will be stored on a password protected and encrypted Qualtrics account or 
downloaded and kept on a password protected and encrypted computer or USB drive.  
•     Only researchers directly involved in the study will have access to the data.  
•     The email addresses will be deleted as soon as the winners for the drawing are selected 
and emails with the results are sent out.  
 
To protect confidentiality when results of the study are reported, the following measures 
will be taken:  
•     Results of individual surveys will not be reported; results will only be reported in the 
aggregate. 
•     We will avoid reporting or tabling low cell size findings to protect the identity of 
individuals who have rare demographic characteristics.  
  
Future Use of Your Information 
Information about you will only be used by the research team for the project described in 
this document. 
  
If you have Any Questions 
You are encouraged to ask questions at any time during this study. For further 
information about the study, contact Lily Mathison by email at lily@iastate, or Dr. Nathaniel  
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Wade by phone at 515-294-1455, by mail at W112 Lagomarcino 901 Stange Road Ames, 
IA 50011, or by email at nwade@iastate.edu. 
  
Your Consent 
By clicking the arrow button on the lower right hand side of this page, you are certifying 
that you are 18 years of age or over and agree to participate in this research study. 
  
Make sure you understand what the study involves before you agree. If you have questions 
about the study after you agree to participate, you can contact the research team using the 
information provided above.   
  
You may print a copy of this form for your files. 
 (->)  
 
Eligibility  
 
I confirm that I am 18 years of age or older, a licensed health service psychologist, 
fluent in English, reside in the United States of America, and provide services to 
clients/patients (psychotherapy, psychological testing, or medication management if 
applicable) to clients two or more hours per week. 
• I confirm 
• I DO NOT confirm 
Error Message: I'm sorry, but it appears that you are not eligible for the study. Thank you for your 
willingness to complete it. Please exit out of this screen. 
 
Day’s Mental Illness Stigma Scale 
We are interested in your opinions about mental illness and people with mental illnesses in 
general.  
 
1. I don’t think that it is possible to have a normal relationship with someone with a severe 
mental illness.  
2. I would find it difficult to trust someone with a severe mental illness.  
3. It would be difficult to have a close meaningful relationship with someone with a severe 
mental illness. 
4. A close relationship with someone with a severe mental illness would be like living on an 
emotional roller coaster.   
5. I think that a personal relationship with someone with a severe mental illness would be too 
demanding.  
6. Severe mental illnesses prevent people from having normal relationships with others.  
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Level of Contact Report 
Please read each of the following statements carefully. After you have read all of the statements 
below, place a check by the statements that best depict your exposure to persons with a severe 
mental illness. Please select all that apply.  
 
_3_I have watched a movie or television show in which a character depicted a person with 
mental illness.  
_8_ My job involves providing services/treatment for persons with severe mental illness.  
_2_ I have observed, in passing, a person I believe may have had a severe mental illness.  
_5_ I have observed persons with a severe mental illness on a frequent basis.  
_12_ I have a severe mental illness. 
_6_ I have worked with a person who had a severe mental illness at my place of employment.  
_1_ I have never observed a person that I was aware had a severe mental illness.  
_7_ My job includes providing services to persons with severe mental illness.  
_9_ A friend of the family has a severe mental illness.  
_10_I have a relative who has a severe mental illness.  
_4_ I have watched a documentary about severe mental illness. 
_11_I live with a person who has a severe mental illness.    
Note: Rankings made by a panel of experts are included for each item; rankings not show to 
participants.  
 
SSOSH 
1. I would feel inadequate if I went to a therapist for psychological help. 
2. My self-confidence would NOT be threatened if I sought professional help. 
3. Seeking psychological help would make me feel less intelligent. 
4. My self-esteem would increase if I talked to a therapist. 
5. My view of myself would not change just because I made the choice to see a therapist. 
6. It would make me feel inferior to ask a therapist for help. 
7. I would feel okay about myself if I made the choice to seek professional help. 
8. If I went to a therapist, I would be less satisfied with myself. 
9. My self-confidence would remain the same if I sought professional help for a problem I 
could not solve. 
10. I would feel worse about myself if I could not solve my own problems. 
 
SSOMI 
Directions: People at times find that they face mental health problems. This can bring up 
reactions about what mental illness would mean. Please use the 5-point scale to rate the degree to 
which each item describes how you might react if you were to have a mental illness. 
1. I would feel inadequate if I had a mental illness. 
2. My self-confidence would NOT be threatened if I had a mental illness. 
3. Having a mental illness would make me feel less intelligent.  
4. My self-esteem would decrease if I had a mental illness. 
5. My view of myself would not change just because I had a mental illness. 
6. It would make me feel inferior to have a mental illness.  
7. I would feel okay about myself if I had a mental illness.  
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8. If I had a mental illness, I would be less satisfied with myself.  
9. My self-confidence would remain the same if I had a mental illness.  
10. I would feel worse about myself if I had a mental illness.  
 
 
 
GP-CORE 
Directions: This form has statements about how you have been over the last week. Please read 
each statement and think how often you felt that way over the last week. Then click the circle 
closest to this. 
1. I have felt tense, anxious, or nervous 
2. I have felt I have someone to turn to when things go wrong* 
3. I have felt OK about myself*  
4. I have felt able to cope when things go wrong* 
5. I have been troubled by aches, pains, or other physical problems 
6. I have been happy with the things I have done* 
7. I have had difficulty getting to sleep or staying asleep 
8. I have felt warmth or affection for someone* 
9. I have been able to do most things I needed to* 
10. I have felt criticized by other people  
11. I have felt unhappy 
12. I have been irritable when with other people 
13. I have felt optimistic about my future* 
14. I have achieved the things I wanted to* 
 
Group Identification – Mental Illness 
I see myself as a person with a mental illness. 
I am pleased to be a person with a mental illness.  
I feel strong ties with fellow people with mental illness.  
I identify with other people with mental illness.  
 
Group Identification – User of Mental Health Services 
I see myself as a person who uses mental health services. 
I am pleased to be a person who uses mental health services.  
I feel strong ties with fellow people who use mental health services.  
I identify with other people who use mental health services.  
 
Group Identification – Psychologist 
I see myself as a psychologist. 
I am pleased to be a psychologist.  
I feel strong ties with fellow psychologists.  
I identify with other psychologists.  
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Egalitarianism Scale (ES) – Select Items from the Therapy with Women Scale and Created 
Items  
For each of the following statements, decide to what degree it describes your approach to 
counseling and psychotherapy.  
 
In my counseling and/or psychotherapy with clients…  
 
1. I disclose my values to my clients.* 
2. I disclose personal experiences relevant to my clients’ issues.* 
3. I sometimes cry with my clients. 
4. I feel that if not for the therapeutic relationship, I would like to be friends with my clients.  
5. I make a sharp distinction between me as the therapist and them as the clients.  
6. I can see myself having the same experiences, reactions, and emotions as my clients do.  
7. I take specific measures to equalize the power between us. 
8. There is little difference between me and my clients, other than our assigned roles.   
 
Demographic Questionnaire 
Age (in years): 
 
Gender:  
 
Race/Ethnicity:  
 
Do you identify as a person with a disability?  
 Yes, please specify 
 No 
 
Please specify the year you received your psychology license.   
 
In a typical week, how many hours do you spend providing direct clinical services for people 
with mental illness?  
 
What sort of services do you provide? (Select all that apply):  
 Psychotherapy 
 Assessment 
 Medication Management (if Applicable) 
 Other: Please Specify 
 
Although many psychologists see a varied caseload of clients, what percentage of your 
clients/patients fit the following description on average?  
Percentage of my clients who experience symptoms of severe psychopathology (e.g., 
hallucinations, delusions, mania, severe depression). 
 
Have you ever had a mental illness? Yes/no 
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If so, what was your most severe mental health diagnosis(es)?  
 
Have you ever received treatment for a mental illness? Yes/no 
 
If so, from whom? (Please select all that apply):  
- Psychotherapist (master’s level) 
- Psychotherapist (doctoral level) 
- Primary care medical provider 
- Psychiatric specialist (Psychiatrist, psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner, etc.) 
- Emergency department 
- Acute inpatient psychiatric unit  
- Residential treatment  
- Other (Please specify): 
 
If you received treatment from a psychotherapist, how many sessions have you had in the last 5 
years or since receiving your psychology license (if less than 5 years ago)?  
 
Have you ever been on any psychoactive mediations for a mental disorder or concern? Yes/No 
 
 
Debriefing Statement 
Thank you for your participation. Please keep in mind that all of your responses are 
completely anonymous and cannot be connected back to you.  
  
The aim of this study was to examine the relationship between licensed psychologists and 
the stigma of mental illness and psychological/psychiatric services as well as to estimate 
the current prevalence of mental disorders among licensed psychologists. Your responses 
to the survey may give us insight into psychologists’ own experiences with mental illness 
as well as their attitudes toward mental illness. 
  
If you are experiencing personal distress we encourage you to connect with local mental 
health providers or to call the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) HelpLine at 1-800-
950-NAMI (6264).  
  
This survey is a part of Lily Mathison’s dissertation. You can reach her via email 
at lily@iastate.eduor by mail at Department of Psychology, Iowa State University, W112 
Lagomarcino Hall, 901 Stange Road, Ames, IA 50011.  
  
This research is supervised by Nathaniel Wade, a Professor in Counseling Psychology. You 
can reach him at 515-294-1455, via email at nwade@iastate.edu, or by mail to Department 
of Psychology, Iowa State University, W112 Lagomarcino Hall, 901 Stange Road, Ames, IA 
50011.  
  
We are very grateful for your help. Thank you again for participating. 
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If you would like to be entered into the drawing for one of four $50 Amazon gift cards 
and/or you would like to receive a summary of the results after the study is 
completed, click the link below. 
 
https://iastate.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_4UbcfchzSUGjeex 
  
 
 
 
As a reminder, email addresses will be collected separately from your survey answers and 
will not be connected with your data in any way.  
 
Please enter your email address below and select from the following options.   
• I would ONLY like to be entered in the raffle for the $50 Amazon gift card and NOT receive a summary of 
the results when the study has been completed. 
• I would like to be entered in the raffle for the $50 Amazon gift card only AND ALSO receive a summary of 
the results when the study has been completed. 
• I would NOT like to be entered in the raffle for the $50 Amazon gift card and would ONLY like receive a 
summary of the results when the study has been completed. 
 
 
Enter Email Address: ______________ 
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APPENDIX B: ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 
Regression analysis predicting personal stigma of mental illness 
Predictor B SE β p R2 DR2 F p 
Step 1     .040 .040 5.79 .018 
Own mental illness -3.15 1.32 -.201 .018     
Step 2     .062 .021 3.06 .083 
Own mental illness -3.60 1.34 -.230 .008     
GP-CORE 1.67 .956 .149 .083     
Note. SE = standard error of B. Own Mental Illness: 1 = participant reports mental illness, 0 = 
participant does not report mental illness. GP-CORE: current psychological distress.  
 
Regression analysis predicting self-stigma of seeking help 
Predictor B SE β p R2 DR2 F p 
Step 1     .008 .008 1.07 .303 
Own mental illness  1.53 1.48 .089 .303     
Step 2     .203 .195 17.09 .000 
Own mental illness .038 1.36 .002 .978     
GP-CORE 5.58 .973 .450 .000     
Note. SE = standard error of B. Own Mental Illness: 1 = participant reports mental illness, 0 = 
participant does not report mental illness. GP-CORE: current psychological distress. 
 
Regression analysis predicting self-stigma of mental illness 
Predictor B SE β p R2 DR2 F p 
Step 1     .017 .017 2.34 .129 
Own mental illness -2.34 1.53 -.130 .129     
Step 2     .090 .073 10.82 .001 
Own mental illness -3.29 1.51 -.183 .031     
GP-CORE 3.55 1.08 .276 .001     
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Note. SE = standard error of B. Own Mental Illness: 1 = participant reports mental illness, 0 = 
participant does not report mental illness. GP-CORE: current psychological distress. 
Regression analysis predicting personal stigma of mental illness 
Predictor B SE β p R2 F p 
Model Summary     .158 8.23 .000 
Hours .085 .084 .129 .313    
Contact_Total .000 .000 -.210 .335    
Contact_40 .000 .000 .562 .005    
Note. SE = standard error of B. Hours = number of hours per week spent providing clinical 
services. Contact_Total = Years since receiving psychology license*Reported number of hours 
per week providing clinical services*50 weeks per year. Contact_40 = Years since receiving 
psychology license*40 hours per week*50 weeks per year.  
Regression analysis predicting self-stigma of seeking help 
Predictor B SE β p R2 F p 
Model Summary     .016 .709 .549 
Hours .071 .099 .098 .475    
Contact_Total .000 .000 .057 .808    
Contact_40 .000 .000 -.050 .815    
Note. SE = standard error of B. Hours = number of hours per week spent providing clinical 
services. Contact_Total = Years since receiving psychology license*Reported number of hours 
per week providing clinical services*50 weeks per year. Contact_40 = Years since receiving 
psychology license*40 hours per week*50 weeks per year.  
Regression analysis predicting self-stigma of mental illness 
Predictor B SE β p R2 F p 
Model Summary     .013 .565 .639 
Hours -.075 .103 -.100 .468    
Contact_Total .000 .000 .089 .707    
Contact_40 .000 .000 .015 .943    
Note. SE = standard error of B. Hours = number of hours per week spent providing clinical 
services. Contact_Total = Years since receiving psychology license*Reported number of hours 
per week providing clinical services*50 weeks per year. Contact_40 = Years since receiving 
psychology license*40 hours per week*50 weeks per year.  
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APPENDIX C: IRB APPROVAL MEMO 
                        
 
 
 
 
Date:  07/08/2019 
 
To: Lily Mathison Nathaniel Wade 
  
From: Office for Responsible Research  
 
Title: Professional Psychologists and Mental Health-Related Stigma: Exploring a Complicated 
Relationship 
 
IRB ID: 19-332 
 
Submission Type:  Initial Submission  Review Type: Expedited 
 
Approval Date:  07/08/2019   Approval Expiration Date:  N/A 
 
 
 
The project referenced above has received approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Iowa State 
University according to the dates shown above. Please refer to the IRB ID number shown above in all 
correspondence regarding this study. 
 
To ensure compliance with federal regulations (45 CFR 46 & 21 CFR 56), please be sure to: 
 
• Use only the approved study materials in your research, including the recruitment materials and 
informed consent documents that have the IRB approval stamp. 
 
• Retain signed informed consent documents for 3 years after the close of the study, when 
documented consent is required. 
 
• Obtain IRB approval prior to implementing any changes to the study or study materials. 
 
• Promptly inform the IRB of any addition of or change in federal funding for this study.  Approval of 
the protocol referenced above applies only to funding sources that are specifically identified in the 
corresponding IRB application.  
 
• Inform the IRB if the Principal Investigator and/or Supervising Investigator end their role or 
involvement with the project with sufficient time to allow an alternate PI/Supervising Investigator to 
assume oversight responsibility.  Projects must have an eligible PI to remain open. 
 
Institutional Review Board 
Office for Responsible Research 
Vice President for Research  
2420 Lincoln Way, Suite 202 
Ames, Iowa 50014 
515 294-4566 
 
 
FAX 515-294-4267  
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• Immediately inform the IRB of (1) all serious and/or unexpected adverse experiences involving risks 
to subjects or others; and (2) any other unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects or others. 
 
• IRB approval means that you have met the requirements of federal regulations and ISU policies 
governing human subjects research.  Approval from other entities may also be needed.  For example, 
access to data from private records (e.g., student, medical, or employment records, etc.) that are 
protected by FERPA, HIPAA, or other confidentiality policies requires permission from the holders of 
those records.  Similarly, for research conducted in institutions other than ISU (e.g., schools, other 
colleges or universities, medical facilities, companies, etc.), investigators must obtain permission from 
the institution(s) as required by their policies.  IRB approval in no way implies or guarantees that 
permission from these other entities will be granted. 
 
• Your research study may be subject to post-approval monitoring by Iowa State University’s Office for 
Responsible Research.  In some cases, it may also be subject to formal audit or inspection by federal 
agencies and study sponsors. 
 
• Upon completion of the project, transfer of IRB oversight to another IRB, or departure of the PI and/or 
Supervising Investigator, please initiate a Project Closure to officially close the project.  For information 
on instances when a study may be closed, please refer to the IRB Study Closure Policy.     
 
If your study requires continuing review, indicated by a specific Approval Expiration Date above, you should: 
 
• Stop all human subjects research activity if IRB approval lapses, unless continuation is necessary to 
prevent harm to research participants. Human subjects research activity can resume once IRB approval 
is re-established. 
 
• Submit an application for Continuing Review at least three to four weeks prior to the Approval 
Expiration Date as noted above to provide sufficient time for the IRB to review and approve 
continuation of the study. We will send a courtesy reminder as this date approaches. 
 
 
Please don’t hesitate to contact us if you have questions or concerns at 515-294-4566 or IRB@iastate.edu. 
 
 
 
